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TORTS
I. UNINTENTIONAL TORTS
A. Proximate Cause
In 1974, the South Carolina Supreme Court dealt with the
issue of proximate cause in two factually similar cases. Both
McQuillen v. Dobbs1 and Thorburn v. Spartanburg Theatres,
Inc.,2 were landlord-tenant actions brought by lessees to recover
damages to personal property sustained when the leased premises
were destroyed by fire. The lessor in each case allegedly breached
his duty of care toward the lessee by failing to take adequate
safety precautions to prevent fire. In Thorburn, the lessee rented
retail space in defendant's theater building for use as a jewelry
store. The electrical system of the building had been in very poor
condition prior to the fire and the defendant's negligence in fail-
ing to replace the defective wiring was alleged to have been the
proximate cause of the fire.
To establish causation, Mrs. Thorburn showed that the de-
fendant's employees had routinely replaced 15 amp fuses with 30
amp fuses, thus causing the wiring to "get twice as hot."3 To
increase the likelihood that the fire originated in the electrical
system she also showed that the fire was probably not caused by
lightning, arson, or smoldering cigarettes. The court held that the
evidence was sufficient to justify a jury finding that "the fire was
caused by defendant's failure to properly maintain the electrical
system."4 The jury in Thorburn clearly had some evidence on
which to base a decision that, more likely than not, the fire would
not have occurred but for the defendant's negligence.
In McQuillen, however, the proximate cause issue was more
difficult to resolve. The plaintiffs (Furman and Doris McQuillen
and David Parsons) were lessees of a mobile home which was
destroyed by a fire which apparently originated in the home's fuel
oil furnace. The defendant-lessor (Dobbs) and his servant had
inspected the furnace the day before the fire and, finding nothing
wrong, had lighted the pilot light. Dobbs and his servant, how-
ever, did not follow the manufacturer's recommended procedure
1. 262 S.C. 386, 204 S.E.2d 732 (1974).
2. 263 S.C. 165, 208 S.E.2d 919 (1974).
3. Id. at 167, 208 S,E.2d at 920.
4. Id. at 169.
1
et al.: Torts
Published by Scholar Commons, 1975
TORTS
for the annual inspection and calibration of the furnace's oil con-
trol valve and the court found that a malfunction of this device
was the cause of the fire. There was some evidence to support the
court's conclusion that a control valve malfunction caused the
fire; the court, however, did not deal with the question of whether
the malfunction would have been detected had the defendants
followed recommended procedure.
To clarify the often confusing concept of proximate cause, a
two-step analysis is most useful.5 The first step is to ask whether
the alleged negligence was a "cause in fact" of the injury.' This
is a jury question which is usually decided by applying the "but
for" test.7 The test is applied by asking whether the accident
would not have happened "but for" the negligence of the defen-
dant. The second step involves a judicial policy determination of
the extent to which a defendant will be held liable for his negli-
gence.' Occasionally, a minor act of negligence will result in a
number of serious consequences, as when a field is ignited by a
locomotive spark and the spreading fire burns a number of houses
situated some distance from the railroad tracks.' The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court has adopted two tests to set the limits on
liability for the consequences of one's negligence. These are the
"foreseeability" and "natural and probable consequences"
tests."0
In adopting the foreseeability test, the court has made a
policy determination that a tort-feasor will not be liable for the
5. See generally W. PROssER, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 41-42 (4th ed. 1971).
6. Id.
7. See Horton v. Greyhound Corp., 241 S.C. 430, 128 S.E.2d 776 (1962), where the
"but for" test was used to decide whether the plaintiff's contributory negligence was a
"cause in fact" of the accident.
8. W. PROssER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 244 (4th ed. 1971).
9. See, e.g., Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866), in which the defendant
railroad negligently set fire to its woodshed and the fire spread to and destroyed plaintiff's
house situated some distance from the shed. The defendant was not held liable because
the burning of plaintiff's house was a remote rather than an immediate consequence of
defendant's negligence.
10. "It is sufficient that [the defendant] should have foreseen that his negligence
would probably cause injury to something or someone. He may be held liable for anything
which appears to have been a natural and probable consequence of his negligence." Child-
ers v. Gas Lines, Inc., 248 S.C. 316, 325, 149 S.E.2d 761, 765 (1966) (emphasis added).
"It is sufficient that in view of all the attendant circumstances, [the defendant should
have foreseen that his negligence would probably result in injury of some kind to some
one." Joiner v. Fort, 226 S.C. 249, 254, 84 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1954) (emphasis added),
quoting from Tobias v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 190 S.C. 181, 186, 2 S.E.2d 686, 688
(1954).
1975]
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consequences of his negligence, even though "causation in fact"
is clearly shown, if a reasonable man could not have "foreseen"
that some injury could possibly result from that negligence. Simi-
larly, the tort-feasor will not be liable if the injury complained of
was not a "natural and probable consequence" of his negligence.
Applying this two-step analysis to McQuillen reveals a gap
in the opinion, for only the second step was discussed by the
court. The court clearly found that the judicial policies contained
in the "foreseeability" and "natural and probable consequences"
tests did not relieve the defendants of liability for the conse-
quences of their negligence" but failed to consider the threshold
issue raised by the first step - whether the negligent inspection
of the oil control valve was a "cause in fact" of the fire.
The court's duty was to determine whether the jury's finding
of "causation in fact" was based on inferences from circumstan-
tial evidence or whether it was based on speculation and conjec-
ture. If the verdict had a basis in evidence, it was to be affirmed;
but if based on speculation and conjecture, it was to be reversed. 2
By affirming the jury's verdict, the court held that the requisite
circumstantial evidence existed. The court, however, did not
identify this "evidence" that was the basis for the inference of
"causation in fact."
A comparison of McQuillen with Horton v. Greyhound
Corp. 3 illustrates the problem of differentiating between circum-
stantial evidence and speculation and conjecture. In Horton, a
bus collided with a truck which suddenly turned into the bus'
lane of travel. The issue was whether the contributory negligence
of the bus driver in exceeding the speed limit was the "cause in
fact" of the accident. In finding for the bus company, the court
decided that there were no circumstances which could justify a
finding that but for the speed of the bus the accident would not
have happened. Instead, the issue of causation was left to specu-
11. "Defendants should have foreseen that the superficial (negligent) manner in
which they inspected and serviced the furnace would probably result in its malfunction
and injury to others. They are chargeable with the natural and probable consequences of
their negligent conduct." 262 S.C. 386, 392-93, 204 S.E.2d 732, 735 (1974) (emphasis
added).
12. Compare Player v. Thompson, 259 S.C. 600, 193 S.E.2d 531 (1972), in which a
jury verdict based on circumstantial evidence was affirmed, with Horton v. Greyhound
Corp., 241 S.C. 430, 128 S.E.2d 776 (1962), in which the jury was not permitted to specu-
late whether the plaintiff's contributory negligence was a cause in fact of the accident.
13. 241 S.C. 430, 128 S.E.2d 776 (1962).
[Vol. 27
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lation and conjecture, and a directed verdict for the defendant
was required. The court said that "[s]ome evidence that if the
bus had been operated at a reasonable speed it could have been
stopped at some distance short of the collision point is required
to support . . an inference of [causal connection]."' 4
An application of this language to the McQuillen case would
seem to require a different result. According to Horton, "some
evidence" was required as to "causation in fact;" the McQuillen
court, however, seemed to neglect this requirement. The closest
the McQuillen court came to explaining the connection between
the negligence of the defendants and the malfunction of the con-
trol valve was its statement that "the fire resulted from a mal-
function in the control mechanism of the furnace, which was
inspected in a superficial manner." 5 It is difficult to see how the
court's use of the word "which" established a "cause in fact"
relationship between the superficial inspection and the malfunc-
tion, for the mere fact that the valve was negligently inspected
does not of itself indicate that its subsequent malfunction was the
necessary consequence of such negligence. The valve might have
malfunctioned even if it had been inspected in accordance with
recommended procedure, yet no evidence was presented to rebut
this possibility as it was in Thorburn. Thus, the "but for" test
required to establish "causation in fact" was not technically met.
Although the justification for the result appears to be some-
what inadequate, the result itself seems correct. The recognition
of this fact is helpful in analyzing the court's decisional process.
The court's discussion of "circumstantial evidence" and "specu-
lation and conjecture" is somewhat misleading. Such language
seems to be used by the court as a means of justifying rather than
reaching a result. The determinative facts seem to be those which
accentuate the policy considerations of the case rather than those
which indicate whether a verdict is based on circumstantial evi-
dence or on speculation and conjecture.
Two policies justified the result in McQuillen despite the
lack of even circumstantial evidence as to causation. One was the
public policy of encouraging a high degree of care in repairmen
where a danger to human life is involved. Dobbs should have
realized that the lessees of his trailer could easily perish by fire if
14. Id. at 440, 128 S.E.2d at 782.
15. 262 S.C. 386, 392, 204 S.E.2d 732, 735 (1974) (emphasis added).
1975]
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the furnace should malfunction. With this in mind, he should
have thoroughly inspected all parts of the furnace or, if he was
unfamiliar with the inspection procedure, he should have hired
someone with the requisite skill. The court seemed unwilling to
permit such a breach of duty to go impunished just because the
court could not point to evidence which could establish the "but
for/causation in fact" step in the proximate cause requirement.
The second policy relates to the need to resort to speculation.
Determination of the cause of a fire is usually difficult, and it was
clear that the McQuillens would have had a hard time presenting
any good evidence as to causation. Even expert opinion would
have necessarily been somewhat speculative.
Undoubtedly, the "circumstantial evidence" and "specula-
tion and conjecture" language will continue to be used by the
court. In light of McQuillen, however, it may be advisable not to
place too much emphasis on such language in presenting an argu-
ment for or against the existence of "causation in fact" for it
appears that the supreme court does not always strictly adhere
to the traditional tort requirement of causation. Instead, in some
cases, where even circumstantial evidence as to causation is diffi-
cult to obtain and public policy dictates liability on a negligent
defendant, proof of negligence may be the "circumstantial evi-
dence" which permits an inference of causation and a finding of
liability.
B. Negligence
The sufficiency of the evidence required to establish a prima
facie case of negligence was at issue in McQuillen v. Dobbs6 and
Kirkland v. Hardwicke Chemical Co. 17 In Kirkland, an action was
brought against the chemical company for its alleged pollution of
a stream which crossed the plaintiffs' property. Testimony indi-
cated that two fish kills had occurred in the stream during 1970
and that each time one of the plaintiffs had noticed a foul odor
emanating from the stream. Although the South Carolina Pollu-
tion Control Authority investigated each incident, no water sam-
ples were taken and no attempt was made to determine the cause
of the fish kills.
The plaintiffs based their case on evidence showing that ap-
16. 262 S.C. 386, 204 S.E.2d 732 (1974).
17. 262 S.C. 520, 205 S.E.2d 831 (1974).
[Vol. 27
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proximately six months prior to the first kill, traces of toxic ben-
zyl alcohol, a chemical harmful to fish, had been detected.in the
water downstream from defendant's plant. Defendant's expert,
however, testified that had benzyl alcohol been the cause of the
fish kills, a three year period would have been required for the
stream to recover; yet a 1971 test showed the stream to have a
healthy fish population. The defendant also asserted that the fish
kills could not be traced to its plant operations with any degree
of certainty because there were other possible explanations for the
kills."8 The court held that there was insufficient evidence to go
to the jury as no evidence had been presented to show that the
defendant had negligently polluted the stream. 9
McQuillen, discussed earlier with respect to proximate
cause, also dealt with the negligence issue; unlike Kirkland, how-
ever, the evidence presented to the jury was deemed sufficient.
The defendants in McQuillen had claimed that the evidence was
insufficient to justify a finding of negligence on their part. The
plaintiffs' expert, however, testified that the oil control valve
should have been inspected each year "to make sure there is no
debris or water in it""0 and that during that inspection it should
have been calibrated to insure that the proper amount of fuel
would flow through the valve at a given rate." The defendants
indicated that they were unfamiliar with the calibration proce-
dure and that their inspection of the valve consisted primarily of
observing its operation to see if it appeared to be working pro-
perly.2 The court found this testimony to be sufficient to justify
a finding of negligence, citing the frequently quoted rule that
"[w]hile . . . the so called doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not
apply in this State. . . negligence may be proved by circumstan-
18. Other possible causes of the fish kill suggested by the defendant were "run-offs
of insecticides and herbicides from fields, careless rinsing of spray equipment by farmers,
the discharge of garbage into streams, as well as bacterial diseases, any one of which could
cause fish kills." Id. at 524, 205 S.E.2d at 833.
19. The concluding language used by the court was:
Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the respondent, it
is our opinion that there was not sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of
the appellant requiring that issue to be submitted to the jury .... The evi-
dence in this case is susceptible of only one reasonable inference, that being that
the appellant was not guilty of any negligence.
Id. at 525, 205 S.E.2d at 833.
20. Record at 86.
21. Id. at 86-90.
22. Id. at 130, 142, 148.55.
1975]
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tial evidence as well as direct evidence.""
The court's reference to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
curious for two reasons. First, mention of res ipsa loquitur was
unnecessary since there was clearly ample circumstantial evi-
dence to justify a finding that the defendant's inspection of the
control valve was superficial. In specified situations, res ipsa lo-
quitur operates to create an inference of negligence despite the
plaintiff's failure to prove negligence by direct or circumstantial
evidence.24 Since the testimony showed that the defendants did
not follow proper procedure, evidence of negligence was present
and no need existed to resort to res ipsa loquitur. Second, the
court's refusal to recognize the existence of the doctrine in this
state is really meaningless because, while denying the doctrine by
name, the court has applied it in principle.5
Although the court distinguished between proof of negligence
by circumstantial evidence and the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in
a 1942 case,2 this distinction has apparently been neglected in
23. 262 S.C. 386, 392, 204 S.E.2d 732, 735 (1974). This rule has been stated in similar
form in a number of cases. See, e.g., Shepard v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 233
S.C. 536, 106 S.E.2d 381 (1958); Eickoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S.C. 500, 20 S.E.2d 153
(1942); Gantt v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 193 S.C. 51, 7 S.E.2d 641 (1940).
24. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is usually applied when the following conditions
are present:
(1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff [and (4)]
evidence as to the true explanation of the event must be more readily accessible
to the defendant than to the plaintiff.
W. PROSSER, TMa LAW OF ToRTs § 39, at 214 (4th ed. 1971).
25. See Orr v. Saylor, 253 S.C. 155, 159, 169 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1969) (Weatherford, J.,
dissenting); W. PROSSER, Tha LAW OF ToRTs § 39, at 214 (4th ed. 1971).
26. Eickoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S.C. 500, 20 S.E.2d 153 (1942). The distinction
given by the court was as follows:
It is important in considering the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and its applica-
tion and effect in given cases, to distinguish that doctrine from the principle that
negligence may be established by circumstantial evidence. Failure to observe
this distinction has led to some uncertainty . ...
In other words, in the situation to which res ipsa loquitur as a distinctive
rule applies, there is no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, at least none of
sufficient probative value, to show negligence, apart from the postulate, which
rests on common experience and not on specific circumstances of the instant
case, that physical causes of the kind which produced the accident in question
do not ordinarily exist in the absence of negligence, that is, in the absence of a
breach of duty such as defendant owed to plaintiff.
Id. at 504, 20 S.E.2d at 155, quoting from 38 Am. JUR. Negligence § 297 (1944).
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subsequent cases." In fact, the court has explicitly accepted the
doctrine by its approval of the following jury instruction:
I charge you further that when a thing which causes injury or
damage is shown to be under the management or control of
another and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if the one who possesses the manage-
ment or control use [sic] proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absense [sic] of explanation, that the accident
arose from the lack of care.
28
A comparison of this quotation with the language used by Dean
Prosser to explain the elements of the doctrine reveals an identity
in meaning.29 It can be argued with great persuasiveness that the
doctrine has in fact been applied in this state in the past. for in
1969, the court, in Orr v. Saylor,3 1 appeared to openly recognize
that despite its continuing denial of the doctrine in name, in
substance it may have been following the rule. The court even
27. The Eickoff distinction between res ipsa loquitur and circumstantial evidence
was apparently ignored in some subsequent cases. Compare Eickoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc.,
199 S.C. 500, 20 S.E.2d 153 (1942), with Maus v. Pickens Sentinel Co., 258 S.C. 6, 12,
186 S.E.2d 809, 811-12 (1972) (approved jury instruction stating that "when a thing which
causes injury or damage is shown to be under the management or control of another and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if the one who
possesses the management or control use [sic] proper care, it affords reasonable evidence,
in the absence of explanation, that the accident arose from lack of care"), Childers v. Gas
Lines, Inc., 248 S.C. 316, 323-24, 149 S.E.2d 761, 764 (1966) (circumstantial evidence
found to exist when "the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care"), Chaney v. Burgess, 246
S.C. 261, 143 S.E.2d 521 (1965) (circumstantial evidence of negligence existed where
chain fastened by defendant to plaintiff's tractor came undone despite lack of any showing
that defendant had negligently fastened the chain), Shepard v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 233 S.C. 536, 106 S.E.2d 381 (1958) (circumstantial evidence existed as to car
owner's negligence where, without explanation, the car rolled down a hill from its parked
position and collided with plaintiff's car, the court using the same language used in Maus
V. Pickens Sentinel Co., supra) and Barnwell v. Elliot, 225 S.C. 62, 80 S.E.2d 748 (1954)
(mere fact that heavy piece of lumber fell from stack injuring plaintiff was sufficient
circumstantial evidence that the superintendant had negligently placed said piece of
lumber on the stack).
28. Maus v. Pickens Sentinel Co., 258 S.C. 6, 12, 186 S.E.2d 809, 811 (1972).
29. See note 24 supra.
30. See note 25 supra.
31. 253 S.C. 155, 169 S.E.2d 396 (1969). This case was an action against a service
station owner by a woman who slipped on some grease in the station's repair area and
fell into the grease pit. The alleged negligence was the failure of the defendant to ade-
quately provide for the safety of his customers and his failure to warn the plaintiff of a
known hazard. The court found that insufficient evidence existed to justify a finding of
negligence.
8
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indicated that in an appropriate case it might admit to the appli-
cability of res ipsa loquitur in South Carolina.2 An appropriate
case would be one in which imposition of liability on the defen-
dant would be justified in the absence of any direct or circum-
stantial evidence of his negligence. Mc Quillen, however, was not
such a case; it remains to be seen whether the supreme court will
finally embrace the doctrine in name as well as in principle.
C. Last Clear Chance
The last clear chance doctrine operates as an exception to the
general rule that a plaintiff's contributory negligence is a com-
plete defense to his action based on negligence.33 Under this doc-
trine, a plaintiff whose negligent conduct places him in a position
of peril34 from which he cannot extricate himself may maintain a
suit against the person who injured him if that person had the last
clear chance to avoid the accident. Although the supreme court
at one time refused to accept the doctrine,35 it is currently the law
in this state."
One of the 1974 cases dealing with last clear chance was
Faircioth v. WahabY7 In Faircloth, a 9-year-old boy was injured
when he was struck by the defendant's automobile at an intersec-
tion. The plaintiff, driving a mini-bike, was unable to obey a stop
sign due to the presence of some sand in the road. He had appar-
ently been driving too fast and had failed to watch for such haz-
ards. Consequently, he entered the intersection into the path of
defendant's car which was approaching from the plaintiff's left.
32. This indication was made in the following language:
Perhaps, in an appropriate case, we should [re-examine 'this courts often
stated position with respect to the res ipsa loquitur rule] and consider whether
we have heretofore, while denying the rule by name, followed it in substance in
applying the circumstantial evidence rule.
Id. at 158-59, 169 S.E.2d at 396.
33. See Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. REv. 3, 21
(1927); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 479, comment a at 530
(1965). But see Seay v. Southern Ry.-Carolina Div., 205 S.C. 162, 174, 31 S.E.2d 133,
138 (1944).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 479, comment c at 531
(1965).
35. Blackwell v. First Nat. Bank of Columbia, 185 S.C. 427, 194 S.E. 339 (1937);
Spillers v. Griffin, 109 S.C. 78, 95 S.E. 133 (1918). See also 2 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES,
THE LAw OF TORTS § 22.13, at 1246 n.5 (1956).
36. Jones v. Atlanta-Charlotte Air Line Ry., 218 S.C. 537, 63 S.E.2d 476 (1951).
37. 263 S.C. 348, 210 S.E.2d 592 (1974).
[Vol. 27
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The defendant had been driving down a through street at approx-
imately 25 to 30 miles per hour with a clear view ahead but with
his view of the road entering from the right obstructed by a large
brush pile. After passing the brush pile and just as the front of
his car entered the intersection, the defendant saw the plaintiff
and, realizing that the plaintiff was not going to stop, immedi-
ately "hit the brakes. 38 As the plaintiff crossed in front of him,
the defendant tried to swerve to the right to avoid a collision,39
but was unsuccessful as his automobile's front left fender struck
the boy.
In the suit which followed, the plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident but that
he negligently failed to do so." After the defendant answered and
38. The defendant's testimony was as follows:
Q. When did you realize the child was not going to stop?
A. Almost as soon as I saw him.
Q. At what point did you put on your brakes?
A. Well, right after I saw him, I realized he wasn't going to stop. It was just an
instantaneous thing. I hit the brakes almost as soon as I saw him.
Record at 9.
39. The defendant testified as follows:
Q. All right. Did you try to go to your right or the left? You bad stated that you
swerved before the impact. Which way did-
A. I swerved to the right.
Q. Why did you swerve to the right?
A. Well, when I saw him, he was coming out in front of me, so I tried to cut it
to the right and go around him, as I was applying the brakes.
Q. You were trying to go behind him?
A. Yes, sir.
Record at 16.
40. The plaintiffs theory of recovery was set out in paragraph seven of his complaint
as follows:
The defendant William Russell Wahab saw and discovered the plaintiff as he
approached the intersection, realized or should have realized that plaintiff was
about to place himself in a position of peril by riding into the path of the
automobile, and had the last clear chance thereupon to avoid the collision in
question by the exercise of ordinary care. Nevertheless, after he had actually
discovered plaintiff's position and realized or should have realized that he was
likely to ride into the path of the automobile, and had the last clear chance to
avoid the collision, defendant William Russell Wahab negligently, willfully, and
recklessly failed to operate his automobile in such a way as to avoid the collision.
Specifically, this defendant:
(a) failed to sound his horn;
(b) failed to apply his brakes in sufficient time;
(c) failed to decelerate as he approached the intersection;
(d) failed to swerve to avoid the collision;
(e) failed to have his automobile under proper control;
(f) failed to keep a proper lookout; and
10
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depositions of the plaintiff and defendant were taken, the defen-
dant moved for summary judgment on the ground that he did not
have the last clear chance as a matter of law. The trial judge
agreed and granted the defendant's motion.
In a three-two decision-Justice Brailsford writing for the
majority-the supreme court reversed. The court held that an
issue of fact existed as to whether the defendant "should have
seen the 9-year-old plaintiff on a mini-bike, approaching the in-
tersection 20 to 25 miles per hour, in time to have avoided injur-
ing him. ' 4 "If he did or should have done so,'4" Justice Brailsford
thought it was "for the jury to say whether due care under the
circumstances required him to take precautions while there was
yet time to avoid the accident which ensued."43 He was concerned
with the issue of whether the defendant took adequate precau-
tions prior to the plaintiff's running of the stop sign and whether
the plaintiff could be held guilty of contributory negligence.
These issues, however, did not relate to whether the defendant
had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. As was shown by
Justice Littlejohn's dissent, negligence antecedent to the time at
which the plaintiff enters a zone of peril is immaterial under the
doctrine of last clear chance." Justice Brailsford also seemed to
recognize, at least circuitously, that the factual issues relating to
the defendant's antecedent negligence were irrelevant when he
stated that "plaintiff, by casting his complaint on the doctrine of
last clear chance, may have alleged more than he must prove to
establish submissible issues."4 Nevertheless, despite the plain-
tiff's failure to properly frame his theory of recovery, the majority
reversed the summary judgment and suggested that the plaintiff
move to amend his complaint.
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Littlejohn objected to the
court's willingness to reverse a summary judgment by finding
(g) failed to use the last clear chance to avoid the collision.
Record at 2.
41. 263 S.C. at 350, 210 S.E.2d at 593.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. The dissent quoted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 479,
comment h at 533 (1965) which states in part:
If the defendant, after discovering the plaintiff's peril, does all that can reasona-
bly be expected of him, the fact that his efforts are defeated by antecedent lack
of preparation or a previous course of negligent conduct is not sufficient to make
him liable.
45. 263 S.C. 348, 351, 210 S.E.2d 592, 593 (1974).
564 [Vol. 27
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factual issues related to theories not pleaded. He found that the
plaintiff "proceeded solely under the doctrine of last clear
chance"46 and consequently the only consideration was whether
the defendant was negligent after the plaintiff's contributory neg-
ligence had placed him in a perilous situation. Contributory neg-
ligence, of course, was not at issue since by proceeding under the
doctrine of last clear chance the plaintiff admitted that he was
negligent.47 Justice Littlejohn relied on section 479 of the
Restatement of Torts, as accepted by South Carolina in Jones v.
Atlanta-Charlotte Air Line Ry., s to extrapolate the applicable
rule as follows:
46. Id. at 352, 210 S.E.2d at 594. (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).
47. Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has not made this definitive state-
ment, the truth of it is evident from the nature of the doctrine of last clear chance itself,
since that doctrine only applies after the plaintiff has negligently placed himself in peril.
See Redmon v. Southern Ry., 195 N.C. 764, 143 S.E. 829 (1928) (last clear chance doctrine
does not arise until injured party's contributory negligence appears); Van Sickler v. Wash-
ington & O.D. Ry., 142 Va. 857, 128 S.E.367 (1925) (doctrine of last clear chance does not
arise unless plaintiff is negligent).
48. 218 S.C. 537, 63 S.E.2d 476 (1951). This case quotes RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 479
which states:
A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to a risk of harm from the
defendant's subsequent negligence may recover for harm caused thereby if,
immediately preceding the harm,
(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of reasonable vigi-
lance and care, and
(b) the defendant
1. knows of the plaintiff's situation and realizes the helpless peril
involved therein; or
2. knows of the plaintiff's situation and has reason to realize the
peril involved therein; or
3. would have discovered the plaintiff's situation and thus had
reason to realize the plaintiff's helpless peril had he exercised the
vigilance which it was his duty to the plaintiff to exercise, and
(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and
competence his then existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff.
This section has been modified such that RESTAEENT (SEcoND) OF ToiRrs § 479 now
provides:
A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to a risk of harm from the
defendant's subsequent negligence may recover for harm caused thereby if,
immediately preceding the harm,
(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of reasonable vigi-
lance and care, and
(b) the defendant is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care
and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm, when
he
(i) knows of the plaintiff's situation and realizes or has reason to
realize the peril involved in it or
12
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[The doctrine of last clear chance] allows a plaintiff who negli-
gently subjects himself to a risk of harm to recover damages
from a defendant if immediately preceding the harm
1. the plaintiff, after his negligent subjection to risk of harm,
was unable to avoid the harm by exercising reasonable care, and
2. the defendant knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care
should have known, of the plaintiff's helpless peril, and
3. the defendant, after he recognized or should have recognized
the plaintiff's peril, was negligent in utilizing his then existing
ability to avoid the harm to the plaintiff.49
In light of this rule, the dissent found that the factual issues relied
on by the majority as grounds for reversal of the summary
judgment were irrelevant to the theory argued by the plaintiff.
This finding was expressed as follows:
Even considering a speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour too fast for
a residential area, or even conceding that defendant should have
seen plaintiff before reaching the brush pile, this negligent driv-
ing on the part of the defendant would have no effect on the
outcome of the case. The last clear chance doctrine is not related
to the antecedent or initial negligence of a defendant. It is con-
cerned with the defendant's conduct after the peril of the plain-
tiff has been recognized or should have been recognized."0
Since the defendant's liability was dependent upon the exist-
ence of his negligence after the plaintiff had run the stop sign and
since both parties apparently entered the intersection simultane-
ously, there was virtually no time in which the "defendant could
and the plaintiff could not avert the accident."5 Accordingly, the
dissent argued as a matter of law that no last clear chance was
available to the defendant to avoid the accident and that the
summary judgment was properly granted.
The dissent's argument is more persuasive because motions
for summary judgment should be considered only on the basis of
the theories pleaded. The majority, in order to confine its opinion
to the appropriate rules governing summary judgments 2 and the
(ii) would discover the situation and thus have reason to realize the
peril, if he were to exercise the vigilance which it is then his duty
to the plaintiff to exercise.
49. 263 S.C. 348, 354-55, 210 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1974) (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 355, 210 S.E.2d at 596.
51. Id. at 356, 210 S.E.2d at 596.
52. S.C. CIR. CT. R. 44(c) (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides in part:
The [summary] judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings
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doctrine of last clear chance, should have found either that the
plaintiff was pleading last clear chance in the alternative to a
denial of contributory negligence, or that an issue of fact existed
as to whether the defendant actually had the last clear chance
under the applicable rules.
This case implicitly makes two suggestions to practitioners.
One is that last clear chance should be carefully pleaded, prefera-
bly in the alternative to basic negligence theory. The plaintiff in
Faircloth should have avoided the casual use in his pleadings of
legally significant words such as "last clear chance." Rather, he
should have first proceeded on the theory that the defendant's
negligence, and not the plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any,
was the sole proximate cause of the accident. In the alternative,
he should have pleaded the doctrine of last clear chance, alleging
that even if the plaintiff had negligently placed himself in peril,
the defendant still failed to exercise an existing opportunity to
avoid the collision. It is clear that the alternative theory of last
clear chance was weaker than the primary theory of negligence in
the absence of contributory negligence. There was arguably a jury
question as to whether the defendant had been driving too fast
and had failed to maintain a proper lookout and as to whether
the plaintiff as a 9-year-old could be guilty of contributory negli-
gence.-" It would be rather difficult, however, for a jury to find
that the defendant had an opportunity to avoid the accident after
the plaintiff ran the stop sign. In light of the evidence that the
defendant's attempts to brake and swerve were unavailing, it
appears that no opportunity to avoid the collision was available
to him.
The second suggestion is that a litigant opposing a motion for
summary judgment should not confine himself to factual issues
related to the theories pleaded. Rather, issues related to other
theories should be presented to the court and requests should be
made for leave to amend the pleadings accordingly. This appar-
ent discretion given to the trial judge seems to conflict with Cir-
cuit Court Rule 44 which provides that the summary judgment
is to be based on the "pleadings and depositions." It seems that
and depositions . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law (emphasis
added).
53. The capacity of minors for contributory negligence is discussed in the following
section of this survey.
1975]
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the scope of the power to look to theories not pleaded should be
limited lest the usefulness of the summary judgment procedure
be seriously impaired. This departure from rule 44 might indicate
that the supreme court dislikes summary judgment procedure as
dictated in that rule. In any event, it is clear that the court is not
in agreement over this issue 4 and, therefore, the court's power to
look beyond the pleadings awaits further definition.
The other 1974 case in which last clear chance was argued to
the supreme court was Oliver v. BrazelI 5 In Oliver, a 15-year-old
boy on a bicycle was riding on the far left side of the road facing
traffic. After a string of oncoming cars had passed him, he sud-
denly turned to his right to cross the highway and entered the
right lane into the path of the defendant's automobile. The boy
was killed in the ensuing collision and his administratrix brought
a wrongful death action."6 At the trial, the jury was given a "last
clear chance" instruction and a verdict for the plaintiff was
found. The defendant appealed alleging, among other things,
that this instruction was prejudicial error.
The factual situations in Faircloth and Oliver were strikingly
similar. In both cases a young boy on a two-wheeled vehicle sud-
denly crossed into the path of the defendant's automobile. Thus
it would seem that if last clear chance applied in Faircloth, it
would similarly apply in Oliver. A closer look at the cases, how-
ever, reveals a very important distinction. In Faircloth, the pres-
ence of sand on the road made it impossible for the young plaintiff
to stop. He was thus in a helpless situation caused by his prior
negligence in riding too fast and in failing to watch for road haz-
ards. In Oliver, the plaintiff was not helpless but rather
inattentive. If he had been watching what he was doing, he could
have stopped his bicycle prior to the collision.
Although the supreme court does not classify last clear
chance cases in terms of helpless or inattentive plaintiffs, this
54. Justice Littlejohn expressed his dislike of this departure from rule 44 as follows:
The lower court had to determine whether relief should be granted on the basis
of the theory propounded in the complaint as submitted by the plaintiff.
Whether the plaintiff may recover on a different complaint and a different
theory was not before that court and I decline any comment relative to any
theory other than that relied on by the plaintiff in the complaint.
263 S.C. 348,351,210 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1974) (Littlejohn, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
55. 264 S.C. 53, 212 S.E.2d 922 (1974).
56. This action was based on South Carolina's wrongful death statute, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 10-1951 (1962).
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classification is implicit in the results reached in the various cases
which have been decided. The last clear chance doctrine is gener-
ally recognized where the plaintiff is in helpless peril . 7 Two theo-
ries are used in such cases. One is the mechnical application of
section 479 of the Restatement." The other is a more fictional
theory in which the court finds that the plaintiffs prior negli-
gence is not a proximate cause of the injury.-9 Here the court
speaks of the negligence which placed the plaintiff in helpless
peril as being "remote" or as being a "mere condition" of the
injury." The supreme court has applied these theories inter-
changeably, recognizing that they are merely different expres-
sions of the same principle. 1
In cases where the plaintiff's peril results from his inatten-
tiveness, the supreme court refuses to permit the plaintiff to
short-circuit the contributory negligence defense by resorting to
last clear chance.62 Thus, section 480 of the Restatement does not
57. See Smith v. Blackwell, 250 S.C. 170, 156 S.E.2d 867 (1967); Young v. Charleston
& W. Carolina Ry., 229 S.C. 580, 93 S.E.2d 866 (1956); Miller v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.,
225 S.C. 217, 81 S.E.2d 335 (1954); Jones v. Atlanta-Charlotte Air Line Ry., 218 S.C. 537,
63 S.E.2d 476 (1951); Seay v. Southern Ry.- Carolina Div., 205 S.C. 162, 31 S.E.2d 133
(1944).
58. See Faircloth v. Wahab, 263 S.C. 348, 210 S.E.2d 592 (1974) (Littlejohn, J.,
dissenting); Jones v. Atlanta-Charlotte Air Line Ry., 218 S.C. 537, 63 S.E.2d 476 (1951).
See also Young v. Charleston & W. Carolina Ry., 229 S.C. 580, 93 S.E.2d 866 (1956), where
the court cited the Jones case with approval while applying a definition of last clear chance
similar to that expressed in section 479 of the RESTATEMENT.
59. See Smith v. Blackwell, 250 S.C. 170, 156 S.E.2d 867 (1967); Miller v. Atlantic
Coast Line Ry., 225 S.C. 217, 81 S.E.2d 335 (1954); Seay v. Southern Ry.-Carolina Div.,
205 S.C. 162, 31 S.E.2d 133 (1944). This fiction is not accurate in terms of modem
conceptions of proximate cause. "Certainly if a man's negligence has put himself or his
property in a position of peril, that negligence is a proximate cause of the injury which
follows when the perils of the position become realized." 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 22.12, at 1244 (1956). Apparently this fiction has its roots in medieval
notions of causation akin to the so-called last wrongdoer principle. The inadequacy of the
proximate cause explanation for the last clear chance doctrine has been extensively dis-
cussed by the commentators. See, e.g., Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate
Cause, 6 N.C.L. REv. 3, 23-30 (1927); Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 GEO. L.J. 674,
702-04 (1933). Dean Prosser agrees that proximate cause does not furnish an accurate
explanation of the doctrine and has stated that "[t]he real explanation would seem to
be dislike for the defense of contributory negligence which has made the courts rebel at
its application in many situations, and accept without reasoning the conclusion that the
last wrongdoer is necessarily the worst wrongdoer, or at least the decisive one, and should
pay." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 66, at 428 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
60. See cases cited in note 59 supra.
61. Jones v. Atlanta-Charlotte Air Line Ry., 218 S.C. 537, 63 S.E.2d 476 (1951).
62. See Hopkins v. Reynolds, 243 S.C. 568, 135 S.E.2d 75 (1964); Durant v. Stuckey,
221 S.C. 342, 70 S.E.2d 473 (1952); Bishop v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 213 S.C. 125, 48
S.E.2d 620 (1948).
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apply in South Carolina. 3 In refusing last clear chance to the
inattentive plaintiff, the court may deny that the plaintiff was in
a perilous position." It may also assert that the "doctrine [of last
clear chance] is not available where . . . the injured party was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law"6 or where
his "active negligence continued up to the time of the impact."66
Oliver was an inattentive plaintiff case. Thus, under prior
case authority, the last clear chance doctrine was inapplicable
and the trial judge's charge to the jury was erroneous. However,
despite the fact that three separate opinions were written, only
one justice found it necessary to mention last clear chance. Jus-
tices Moss and Littlejohn voted to reverse the trial judge's refusal
to grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict. They found
that the plaintiff's conduct in riding his bicycle into the path of
defendant's car was contributory negligence as a matter of law
63. The last clear chance rule where the plaintiff is "inattentive" is given in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 480 (1965) as follows:
A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable vigilance, could discover the dan-
ger created by the defendant's negligence in time to avoid the harm to him, can
recover if, but only if, the defendant
(a) knows of the plaintiff's situation, and
(b) realizes or has reason to realize that the plaintiff is inattentive and
therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid the harm, and
(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and
competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm.
Section 480 of the First RESTATEMENT is substantially the same as above.
A curious aberration from the supreme court's refusal to apply last clear chance to
the inatteptive plaintiff is the case of Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, 212 S.C. 485, 48
S.E.2d 324 (1948). Here the defendant illegally sold barbiturates without a prescription
to the plaintiff's intestate. The plaintiff alleged that her husband's death by suicide was
a proximate result of his addiction to these illegally obtained drugs. For some unknown
reason, the court felt that the deceased might have been "inattentive" and it accordingly
applied section 480 of the RESTATEMENT. The defendant, however, was found not to have
had the last clear chance under that section because it didn't "know" of the plaintiff's
situation as required by section 480(a). The Scott case referred to section 480 as "sound
law" citing Seay v. Southern Ry.-Carolina Div., 205 S.C. 162, 31 S.E.2d 133 (1944). The
Secay case, however, could not be authority for the applicability of section 480 because it
was a "helpless" plaintiff case as evidenced by its citation in Jones v. Atlanta-Charlotte
Air Line Ry., 218 S.C. 537, 63 S.E.2d 476 (1951) in connection with the application of
section 479 of the RESTATEMENT. The citation of section 480 in Scott was not explained by
the court. The best treatment of this case would seem to be to dismiss its brief discussion
of section 480 as erroneous dictum because the court has repeatedly refused to apply the
last clear chance doctrine to factual situations involving truly inattentive plaintiffs. See
note 62 supra.
64. See Durant v. Stuckey, 221 S.C. 342, 70 S.E.2d 473 (1952).
65. Hopkins v. Reynolds, 243 S.C. 568, 573, 135 S.E.2d 75, 77 (1964).
66. Id. at 574, 135 S.E.2d at 77.
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and that it was thus "unnecessary to consider" 7 the defendant's
exception to the jury instruction. While the doctrine did not have
to be considered in dealing with the defendant's exception, it did
have to be considered in determining whether there was a possible
basis for the jury's verdict. The jury might have agreed with
Justices Moss and Littlejohn that the plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence and still have found for the plaintiff on the
basis of the trial judge's last clear chance charge. If that doctrine
was applicable, the jury's verdict would have to be affirmed; if
the doctrine was inapplicable, the verdict could be reversed.
These two justices apparently felt that the jury verdict could not
stand on the alternate theory of last clear chance. Had they felt
such to be the case, however, they should have so concluded and
given supporting reasons.
Justices Lewis and Bussey, finding that the contributory
negligence issue was a jury question, voted to affirm the judgment
below. They too, however, erroneously failed to reach the issue of
last clear chance. The jury might have found that the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence and still have rendered a
verdict for him on the basis of last clear chance. Thus, by voting
to affirm, these justices seemed to imply that the last clear
chance instruction was proper. If the doctrine was not correctly
charged, then an affirmance would be unjust to the defendant
since the verdict against him could have been based on an inappl-
icable theory of law.
The third opinion was written by Justice Brailsford. He
agreed with Lewis and Bussey that the issue of contributory negli-
gence was a jury question, but he addressed himself to the last
clear chance issue and held that it was improperly charged. Ac-
cordingly, the defendant was entitled to a new trial free from such
an erroneous jury instruction. Justice Brailsford stated his rea-
sons for holding the last clear chance doctrine inapplicable as
follows:
I would sustain the exception to the court's instruction to the
jury on the doctrine of last clear chance, which applies only
when the antecedent negligence of the injured party has become
remote in the chain of causation and a mere condition of the
injury. . . .That is not this case. If the jury should conclude
that plaintiff's intestate had the capacity to exercise care under
67. 264 S.C. 53, 57, 212 S.E.2d 922, 923 (1974).
1975]
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the circumstances and was negligent in failing to look before
attempting to cross the highway, it is inescapable that any such
negligence on his part continued to the moment of impact.
Therefore, the doctrine of last clear chance has no application,
and it was error for the court to give the instruction compained
of.
s
This statement of the applicability of the last clear chance
doctrine should not be overlooked, for implicit in this language
is the crucial distinction between the helpless plaintiff and the
inattentive plaintiff. In the first sentence, Justice Brailsford is
saying that last clear chance applies only where the plaintiff is
helpless. Then he says: "That is not this case." In the next sent-
ence he speaks of negligence continuing to the moment of impact.
Such language has traditionally been used by the court in holding
the doctrine inapplicable to the inattentive plaintiff.
The helpless-inattentive distinction is more than academic.
It is at the heart of the determination of whether the plaintiff or
the defendant will prevail. Generally, the plaintiff will win in the
helpless plaintiff case and the defendant, in the inattentive plain-
tiff case. But that leaves each litigant looking for persuasive argu-
ments when he has the disadvantage. When the plaintiff is con-
fronted with an inattentive plaintiff case, he should attempt to
reclassify the situation. The argument would be that the plain-
tiff's inattentiveness was merely prior negligence which placed
him in a helpless position from which he could not escape by
exercising reasonable care. 9 When the defendant is the'underdog
and is forced to work within the helpless plaintiff category, he
should argue that the plaintiff was negligent at two points in
time: first, when he placed himself in the helpless situation and
second, when he failed to exercise reasonable care in an attempt
to escape his peril." If the plaintiff is negligent in failing to escape
68. Id. at 58-59, 212 S.E.2d at 924 (separate opinion) (emphasis added).
69. See Hopkins v. Reynolds, 243 S.C. 568, 135 S.E.2d 75 (1964) (Bussey, J., dissent-
ing). In his dissent, Justice Bussey indicated that the inattentiveness of the plaintiff was
antecedent negligence and that it had placed her in a helpless condition of peril "where
she could no longer avoid the impact by the simple expedient of stopping." Id. at 585,
135 S.E.2d at 83. See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.13, at 1250
n.21 (1956).
70. See Truett v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 206 S.C. 144, 33 S.E.2d 396 (1945), where
the plaintiff's car stalled on a railroad track and was hit by defendant's train. The court
here refused to give the plaintiff the benefit of the last clear chance rule because it found
that his attempts to escape the peril after stalling on the tracks were negligent.
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the peril, then he is not sufficiently "helpless" to justify the use
of last clear chance." The defendant should also strongly assert
that as a matter of law he had no existing opportunity, or clear
chance, to avoid the accident. Some justices have been somewhat
receptive to this argument where the facts indicate that the acci-
dent was unavoidable.
7 2
D. Contributory Negligence of Children
In civil negligence actions brought by or on behalf of minors,
the determination of the contributory negligence of the youthful
plaintiff is not made according to the same principles as those
which determine whether adults are to be charged with contribu-
tory negligence. Instead, a more subjective two-step test is ap-
plied to determine (1) whether the plaintiff had the capacity to
be negligent and, if so, (2) whether he exercised due care in the
situation.7 3 The determination of capacity is made by applying a
series of presumptions derived from criminal law. A minor under
the age of seven is conclusively presumed to be incapable of neg-
ligence. 4 Between the ages of seven and fourteen, he is presumed
to be incapable of negligence, but this presumption may be rebut-
ted by evidence which shows "that the child did have the capac-
ity to understand the danger involved. '7 If the child is over four-
teen, the rebuttable presumption is that he is capable of negligent
conduct.
7
If the child is deemed capable of negligence, a determination
must then be made as to whether he did in fact fail to exercise
due care. "[T]he question . . . is 'not whether the child acted
as an ordinarily prudent child of its age would have acted, but
whether it acted as a child of its age, and of its capacity, discre-
tion, knowledge, and experience would ordinarily have acted
under the same or similar circumstances.' 77
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, Explanatory Notes § 479, comment c at
531-32 (1966).
72. See Faircloth v. Wahab, 263 S.C. 348, 210 S.E.2d 592 (1974) (Littlejohn, J.,
dissenting); Smith v. Blackwell, 250 S.C. 170, 178, 156 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1967) (Littlejohn,
J., dissenting); Young v. Charleston & W. Carolina Ry., 229 S.C. 580, 591, 93 S.E.2d 866,
872 (1956) (Legge, J., dissenting).
73. Chitwood v. Chitwood, 159 S.C. 109, 156 S.E. 179 (1930); Note, Contributory
Negligence of Children, 18 S.C.L. REV. 648 (1966).
74. See note 73 supra.
75. Note, Contributory Negligence of Children, 18 S.C.L. REV. 648, 653 (1966).
76. See note 73 supra.
77. Chitwood v. Chitwood, 159 S.C. 109, 113, 156 S.E. 179, 180 (1930). The standard
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In Faircloth v. Wahab75 and Oliver v. Brazell,79 which were
discussed in the previous section on last clear chance, the contri-
butory negligence of the minor-plaintiff was at issue in each case.
Although the plaintiff in Fairctoth originally admitted contribu-
tory negligence by proceeding solely under last clear chance,80 the
supreme court reversed the summary judgment and permitted
him to amend the complaint. Thus the court permitted the 9-
year-old plaintiff to avail himself of the prima facie presumption
that he was incapable of contributory negligence. The defendant
would have to present evidence as to the child's capacity, discre-
tion, knowledge and experience for two purposes: (1) to rebut the
presumption of incapacity and (2) to show that a 9-year-old child
of Faircloth's intelligence, discretion, etc., would not have oper-
ated the mini-bike in the same careless manner.
In Oliver, the 15-year-old plaintiff was presumed to be capa-
ble of negligence. To show contributory negligence, however, the
defendant still had to show that the plaintiff had failed to exer-
cise due care according to the more liberal standard, i.e., that he
did not act as a 15-year-old of his same intelligence, capacity,
discretion, knowledge and experience ordinarily would have acted
under similar circumstances. Justices Moss and Littlejohn, as
mentioned in the previous section, voted to reverse, holding that
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law. Justices Lewis, Bussey, and Brailsford, however, believed
that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was an issue for
the jury. The position of these three justices seems more accurate.
Evidence was presented at the trial that the plaintiff was two
grades behind in school and that "[h]e had been reared in the
country by his grandmother."'" Thus it appears that the jury,
using the liberal test for the standard of care for minors, should
have been entitled to weigh this evidence in determining whether
the young boy on the bicycle failed to use due care.
of conduct for children is stated by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1966) as
follows: "If the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid
being negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience
under like circumstances." See also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 154-57 (4th
ed. 1971).
78. 263 S.C. 348, 210 S.E.2d 592 (1974).
79. 264 S.C. 53, 212 S.E.2d 922 (1974).
80. See note 47 supra.
81. Oliver v. Brazell, 264 S.C. 53, 58, 212 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1974) (Lewis, J., dissent-
ing).
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E. Guest Statute
Under the South Carolina guest statute, the driver of a motor
vehicle is not liable to his guest-passenger for acts of ordinary
negligence which result in an accident.12 In order to maintain a
cause of action, the guest must prove that the accident was
caused by the driver's intentional misconduct or by his "heedless-
ness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others."83 Guest
statutes, such as the one in South Carolina, are generally de-
signed to prevent collusive lawsuits between driver and passenger
in an attempt to collect from the driver's insurance company. 4
Although such statutes have the beneficial effect of preventing
such collusive suits, they have a countervailing detrimental ef-
fect, when no collusion is apparent, of relieving the driver of his
responsibility and thus forcing the guest to bear his own loss.,
The South Carolina Supreme Court has liberally construed
the guest statute so that a standard very close to ordinary negli-
gence is applied in legitimate suits; potentially collusive suits are
strictly scrutinized and dismissed if no more than ordinary negli-
gence is shown. In Martin v. Martin,86 the sufficiency of the evi-
dence necessary to prove "heedlessness and reckless disregard of
the rights of others" as required by the South Carolina guest
statute was at issue. There, the plaintiff was a guest-passenger in
her husband's pickup truck. Her testimony, the only evidence of
heedlessness or recklessness, was that the truck was turned into
a rough driveway at an unsafe speed causing her to bounce
around inside the vehicle and then fall out.87
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-801 (1962) provides in pertinent part:
No person transported by an owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest
without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for dam-
ages against such motor vehicle or its owner or operator or caused by his heed-
lessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others.
83. Id.
84. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 34, at 187 (4th ed. 1971).
85. Id.
86. 252 S.C. 168, 203 S.E.2d 385 (1974).
87. Mrs. Martin's testimony was as follows:
Well, we were riding in a Ford pickup. And we had started home, and he was
driving along, ordinarily, reckon, and as he come to the driveway there was
coming a car behind him. So he speeded up and he swerved the truck in and
there was a hole in the driveway which throwed me back and forth unexpected,
and I fell out.
Id. at 171-72, 203 S.E.2d at 386.
A similar factual situation was presented to the supreme court last year by the case
of Garrett v. Reese, 262 S.C. 327, 204 S.E.2d 432 (1974) (per curiam). There the guest-
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The court stated that there was no evidence "from which it
could be reasonably inferred that the husband, or the wife for that
matter, was conscious of any conduct on the part of the husband
which was an invasion of the rights of the wife,""8 despite the fact
that "[ilt may very well be that the husband did not operate the
vehicle as skillfully or carefully as he might have . . . ,'"9
The South Carolina Legislature passed the guest statute in
its present form in 1930, and the supreme court construed it in
1935 in the case of Fulghum v. Bleakley ° In a thorough discus-
sion of the legislative intent of the statute, the court held the
statute to apply to two classes of cases: (1) where "the accident
was caused by intentional misconduct""1 and (2) where "it was
caused by heedless or reckless disregard of the rights of others,
meaning thereby something more than the mere failure to exer-
cise [due care]."" Since Martin did not involve "intentional
misconduct," the defendant was to be held liable only if he acted
with heedless and reckless disregard for the rights of his wife.
Since the terms "heedless" and "reckless" are rather vague
characterizations of human conduct, the court has formulated a
test which establishes the existence of such conduct when there
is "a conscious failure to exercise due care"93 or when "a person
passenger, Ms. Garrett, fell out of the driver's car when the door came open as Mr. Reese
was making a left turn at an intersection. The car had stopped in obedience to a stop sign
and had then proceeded into the intersection and into its turn at approximately 15 miles
per hour. No evidence was presented as to why the door opened. The court affirmed a
summary judgment in favor of the defendant because no evidence existed which could
sustain an inference of recklessness.
88. 262 S.C. at 174, 203 S.E.2d at 387.
89. Id.
90. 177 S.C. 286, 181 S.E. 30 (1935). This action was brought against the driver for
injuries suffered by the guest-passenger when the driver, through his speed and apparent
inattentiveness, collided with a car in front of him which was slowing down due to an
obstruction in the road ahead. The court held that whether the defendant acted in reckless
disregard of the plaintiff's rights was a question for the jury.
91. Id. at 291, 181 S.E.2d at 31.
92. Id. "Heedless" and "reckless disregard for the rights of others" was defined as
follows:
Heedless in this connection means careless; it.does not add to the significance
or the characterization or the force of the act or conduct done in reckless disre-
gard of the rights of others by the owner or operator. Act or conduct in reckless
disregard of the rights of others is improper or wrongful conduct, and constitutes
wanton misconduct, evincing a reckless indifference to consequences to the life,
or limb, or health, or reputation or property rights of another.
Id., quoting from Bordonaro v. Senk, 109 Conn. 428, 147 A. 136, 137 (1929).
93. Yaun v. Baldridge, 243 S.C. 414, 419, 134 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1964).
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of ordinary reason and prudence would have been conscious of
[the tort] as an invasion of the rights of the injured party."94 The
question of the "consciousness" of the tort-feasor is no problem
in some cases, especially where the defendant knowingly took a
risk or where he was warned by his guest to cease his reckless
conduct." In other cases, however, the state of mind of the tort-
feasor is not known and the court must rule on the probable
'tconsciousness" of a person of ordinary reason and prudence.
Most of the cases where the jury was permitted to decide the
recklessness issue by probable "consciousness" involved excessive
speed 9 or a failure to keep a proper lookout," because such negli-
gent acts generally involve conscious carelessness by the driver.
In single car accident cases, however, where no eyewitness testi-
mony as to the driver's conduct is presented, the court has gone
as far as to permit an inference of recklessness merely from the
manner in which the accident happened. In two such cases,
Christy v. Reid" and Fuller v. Bailey,99 the juries were allowed to
infer excessive speed or gross inattentiveness from the fact that
the car in question left the road and overturned or crashed into a
utility pole. The Martin court would not permit a jury determina-
tion of recklessness. Although Mrs. Martin testified that her hus-
band increased his speed, there was no evidence that this speed
was excessive to the point of being conscious recklessness.
The severity of the accident appears to be of some import-
94. Martin v. Martin, 262 S.C. 168, 174, 203 S.E.2d 385, 387 (1974), citing Powell v.
Simons, 258 S.C. 242, 246, 183 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1972).
95. See Saxon v. Saxon, 231 S.C. 378, 98 S.E.2d 803 (1957), where the passenger
warned the driver that his speed was dangerous and could cause a tire to blow out, but
the driver did not heed the warning.
96. See, e.g., Saxon v. Saxon, 231 S.C. 378, 98 S.E.2d 803 (1957); Brown v. Hill, 228
S.C. 34, 88 S.E.2d 838 (1955); Peak v. Fripp, 195 S.C. 324, 11 S.E.2d 383 (1940); Fulghum
V. Bleakley, 177 S.C. 286, 181 S.E. 30 (1935). But see Kennedy v. Carter, 249 S.C. 168,
153 S.E.2d 312 (1967).
97. See, e.g., Yaun v. Baldridge, 243 S.C. 414, 134 S.E.2d 248 (1964); Shearer v.
DeShon, 240 S.C. 472, 126 S.E.2d 514 (1962).
98. 244 S.C. 27, 135 S.E.2d 319 (1964). Here the automobile was traveling in a 35 mile
per hour zone and, as it rounded a curve to the left, the car skidded to the right, jumped
the curve, and forcefully struck a telephone pole. The court held that, despite the lack of
direct evidence of the car's excessive speed, an inference of recklessness was justified from
the circumstances of the accident.
99. 237 S.C. 573, 118 S.E.2d 340 (1961). Here the guest-passenger was killed and the
driver sustained severe head injuries and did not remember the accident. The evidence
held to be sufficient to sustain an inference of recklessness was that the car left the road
at the start of a long curve, traveled 240 feet on the shoulder, overturned a few times,
struck a tree and continued another 47 feet where it came to rest.
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ance with respect to the recklessness issue. Mrs. Martin was not
injured in a "wreck;" rather she was hurt when she fell out of the
truck. The evidence indicated that the movement of the truck
across the rough driveway caused the passenger door to open and
resulted in Mrs. Martin's falling to the ground. There was no
evidence that the driver lost control of the vehicle.
Heedless and reckless conduct seems to lie somewhere be-
tween intentional misconduct and such forms of ordinary negli-
gence as simple mistake, inadvertance or inattention. ' Although
the "consciousness" test does not draw a clear line between sim-
ple negligence and the aggravated type of negligence required by
the guest statute, the test is a very useful tool in the hands of the
court. This is true because, while some commentators have se-
verely criticized guest statutes as being against public policy be-
cause the reduced standard of care often makes the guest bear his
own loss, ' the South Carolina guest statute seems less vulnera-
ble to such criticism due to the liberal use of the "consciousness"
test by the supreme court. Not only does the court permit, by use
of the "consciousness" test, extensive inferences of recklessness
in single car accident cases, but the court also uses such a test to
formulate a standard of care very close to ordinary negligence. All
that is needed in addition to ordinary negligence is some finding
that a person of ordinary reason and prudence would be conscious
of that negligence. Yet the guest statute can still retain its origi-
nal purpose of preventing collusive suits."0 2 In a case such as
Martin, where the possiblity of collusion is evident, the court, by
using the "consciousness" test and finding simple carelessness
rather than a conscious failure to exercise due care, can require a
verdict for the defendant and thereby deny recovery for the plain-
tiff.
F. Statutory Violation as Negligence Per Se
As a general rule, a person is deemed negligent if he fails to
adhere to the standard of care imposed by law.'0 3 This standard,
as defined by the courts, requires that a person's conduct conform
to that of a reasonable and prudent man under like circumstan-
100. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 181-87 (4th ed. 1971).
101. Id. at 187.
102. Id.
103. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRs § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
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ces.' "4 Standards of conduct may also be defined by criminal stat-
utes"°5 and, while the courts are usually under no obligation to
apply these standards to civil negligence cases,0 6 such statutory
standards are generally so applied such that a violation of a stat-
ute will be evidence of negligence.' ° This evidentiary rule varies
in probative strength among different jurisdictions.' In South
Carolina,09 as in the majority of jurisdictions,"0 the unexcused
violation of a statutory rule of conduct will be sufficiently strong
evidence of negligence that such conduct will be deemed "negli-
gence per se," i.e., "negligence in itself.""' The minority rule,
however, holds that the statutory violation "is only evidence of
negligence, which the jury may accept or reject as it sees fit."" 2
If the violation of the statute is "excused," the violator will
not be held to be negligent per se."5 This general rule, along with
a list of excuses for violations, is given by the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 288A as follows:
(1) An excused violation of a legislative enactment or an ad-
ministrative regulation is not negligence.
(2) Unless the enactment or regulation is construed not to per-
mit such excuse, its violation is excused when
104. Crawford v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 179 S.C. 264, 184 S.E. 569 (1936). See also
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
105. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 36, at 190-95 (4th ed. 1971). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 286, comment d at 26 (1965),
which states that a "court is free, in making its own judicial rules, to adopt and apply to
the negligence action the standard of conduct provided by such criminal enactment or
regulation."
106. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToiTs § 36, at 191 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 288A, comment b at 30 (1965) and § 286, com-
ment d at 26 (1965).
107. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 200-01 (4th ed. 1971).
108. Id.
109. Bell v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 202 S.C. 160, 24 S.E.2d 177 (1943); Locklear
v. Southeastern Stages, Inc., 193 S.C. 309, 8 S.E.2d 321 (1940); Worrell v. South Carolina
Power Co., 186 S.C. 306, 195 S.E. 638 (1938); Crawford v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 179
S.C. 264, 184 S.E. 569 (1936).
110. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 200 (4th ed. 1971).
111. Id. California has a similar rule in which the violation of the statute creates a
rebuttable presumption of negligence. Id. at 201.
112. Id. at 201.
113. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toirrs § 288A(2)(e) (1965) with Walker v.
Lee, 115 S.C. 495, 106 S.E. 682 (1921), where the court stated that "[w]hen one violates
a statute or ordinance, he is guilty of negligence per se, but he is bound to technically
violate either if by so doing he can avoid inflicting injury to person or property." Id. at
498, 106 S.E. at 683.
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(a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor's inca-
pacity;
(b) he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for
compliance;
(c) he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to com-
ply;
(d) he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own
misconduct;
(e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to
the actor or to others.
Although very few cases involving excuses for statutory violations
have been presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court, that
court does recognize that "explanatory or excusatory circumstan-
ces" may justify conduct in violation of a statute such that that
conduct will not be negligence per se.114
In 1974, two cases were presented to the supreme court in
which the defendants alleged that their violations of traffic stat-
utes were excused. Nabors v. Spencer'1 5 was an action arising
from an intersectional automobile collision. The defendant, a
member of a funeral procession, entered the intersection in viola-
tion of a red traffic light and collided with the plaintiff, who had
lawfully entered the intersection with a green light in his favor.
In a subsequent suit for damages, the plaintiff asserted that the
defendant's violation of section 46-304 of the South Carolina Code
of Laws constituted negligence which was the proximate cause of
the collision. Section 46-304 provides that "[t]he driver of any
vehicle shall obey the instructions of any official traffic-control
device applicable thereto . . .unless otherwise directed by a
traffic or police officer . . . ."I" Since there was no police officer
present at the intersection who could give directions contrary to
the traffic light, a violation of section 46-304 was conclusively
shown.
The defendant, Spencer, argued that this violation was ex-
cused in light of the fact that he was a member of a funeral
procession. The jury was unpersuaded by this argument and re-
turned a verdict of $15,000 for the plaintiff. On appeal to the
supreme court, Spencer presented the same contentions, this
time urging that the violation was excused as a matter of law.
114. Myers v. Evans, 225 S.C. 80, 84, 81 S.E.2d 32, 34 (1954).
115. 262 S.C. 630, 207 S.E.2d 79 (1974).
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-304 (1962).
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Like the jury, however, the court was unmoved and held that
members of funeral processions are not entitled to violate the
state's traffic laws.
Although statutes granting right-of-way privileges to funeral
processions exist in some jurisdictions," 7 there is no such statute
in South Carolina. Furthermore, there is no case law which im-
plies such a privilege."' Since neither statutory nor judicial ex-
ceptions exist for the violation of section 46-304 and since Spencer
had no apparent excuse for running the red light under
Restatement principles, the jury was justified in holding Spencer
liable for the damages proximately caused by his statutory viola-
tion. Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the jury's verdict.
In Davis v. Boyd,"' a truck driven by the defendant crossed
a raised concrete median and collided head-on with the plaintiff's
oncoming car. The statute violated in this case was section 46-
392 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, the pertinent sections
of which provide:
It shall be unlawful for any person:
(1) To drive a vehicle over, upon or across any curb, central
dividing section or other separation or dividing line on any
controlled-access facility or other highway;
(3) To drive any vehicle except in the proper lane provided for
that purpose and in the proper direction and to the right of the
central dividing curb, separation section or line on any
controlled-access facility or other highway provided with such
dividing curb, separation section or line; . . .1
117. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.20 subd. 6 (1960) provides that "when any funeral
procession identifies itself by using regular lights on all cars and by keeping all cars in
close formation, the driver of every other vehicle, except an emergency vehicle, shall yield
the right of way." But see Rinker v. Tyler, 86 Ohio App. 8, 89 N.E.2d 694 (1949), where a
local ordinance granting a right-of-way to funeral processions was held to be superseded
by an Ohio statute requiring obedience to stop signs.
118. In Jones v. Grisset, 258 S.C. 22, 186 S.E.2d 829 (1972), the supreme court
indicated that a funeral procession was not entitled to a right-of-way by its disapproval
of the following jury instruction:
[hIf a person, while driving an automobile, comes upon . . . a procession of
automobiles . . . and if he knows or has reason to believe that it is something
connected with a funeral, then common decency would require a person to yield
and not to break up or disturb something of such a sacred nature. ...
Id. at 26, 186 S.E.2d at 830-31.
119. 262 S.C. 679, 207 S.E.2d 101 (1974).
120. S.C. Cos ANN. § 46-392 (1962).
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As a defense to the plaintiff's suit for damages, the defendant,
Boyd, alleged that the violation of the statute was excused be-
cause a "sudden emergency" caused the violation. Boyd testified
that he was driving along the four-lane highway in the far right
lane and turned into the inner lane nearest the median in order
to pass a slower vehicle. While in the inner lane, the tension in
the steering wheel suddenly gave way and the truck veered to the
left and over the median despite Boyd's attempt to turn it to the
right. Boyd alleged that the proximate cause of the collision was
a sudden breaking of the steering mechanism. While it was shown
that the mechanism was in a broken condition after the accident,
the plaintiff alleged that the break occurred in the head-on colli-
sion. The issue presented, therefore, was whether the break in the
steering mechanism was the cause or result of the accident.' 2' The
resolution of this issue was crucial to a determination of the
applicability of the rule expressed in section 288A(2)(d) of the
Restatement (Second) excusing statutory violations when the
actor is "confronted by an emergency not due to his own miscon-
duct."'22 If the steering failed prior to the accident as alleged by
Boyd, then a strong case would be presented for excusing the
statutory violation. If the steering did not fail prior to the acci-
dent, as alleged by Davis, then no excuse would justify the viola-
tion of the statute and negligence per se would be shown. After
hearing motions for directed verdicts by both plaintiff and defen-
dant, the trial judge granted the plaintiff's motion, apparently
placing great weight on the theory of negligence per se despite the
issue of excuse.
On appeal, Boyd presented two main exceptions: (1) that the
trial judge erred in refusing to grant his motion for a directed
verdict and (2) that the trial judge erred in granting a directed
verdict to the plaintiff. The supreme court held that the denial
of the defendant's motion was not error. This decision was based
on the fact that the jury was entitled to decide whether the break-
ing of the steering mechanism was the cause or result of the
121. See, e.g., Interstate Veneer Co. v. Edwards, 191 Va. 107, 60 S.E.2d 4 (1950),
where a very similar factual situation was presented. There a "steering ball" allegedly
broke causing the defendant to lose control of his truck resulting in a collision with
plaintiff's deceased. The court held that the issue of whether the "breaking of the steering
ball was the cause or result of the collision" was properly submitted to the jury. Id. at
116, 60 S.E.2d at 9.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A(2)(d) (1965).
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accident and thus whether the violation of section 46-392 was
excused. By finding that this issue of fact was material, the court
again implicitly accepted the view of section 288A of the
Restatement (Second) that violations of statutes will not be negli-
gence per se if they are "excused."
With respect to Boyd's second exception, reversal would
seem to have been required since the jury issue which precluded
a directed verdict for the defendant should have also precluded a
directed verdict for the plaintiff. The defense attorney, however,
abandoned this exception by failing to argue it in his brief and
the supreme court accordingly declined to review it.'2 The failure
to argue the second exception was a serious mistake. Had it been
argued, the court would have probably reversed the directed ver-
dict for the plaintiff and a jury would have been permitted to
decide the truthfulness of Boyd's assertion that the steering
mechanism failed prior to the accident.
IX. INTENTIONAL TORTS
A. Fraud and Deceit
Relief upon a cause of action in fraud cannot be granted
unless the plaintiff proves all of the required nine elements by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.1 24 These essential ele-
ments are:
(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) either
knowledge of its falsity or a reckless disregard of its truth or
falsity; (5) intent that the representation should be acted upon;
(6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hearer's reliance
on its truth; (8) the hearer's right to rely thereon; and (9) the
hearer's consequent and proximate injury.25
123. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 8(2) provides in pertinent part as follows:
The brief of appellant shall be preceded by a statement of the questions
involved.
This statement of the questions involved must be set out in the briefest and
most general terms. . . . Ordinarily no point will be considered which is not
set forth in the statement of the questions involved . ...
The supreme court has held that an exception is waived if not argued in the brief. Accord-
ingly, the supreme court will decline to review unargued exceptions. See Seegars v. WIS-
TV (Broadcasting Co. of the South), 236 S.C. 355, 114 S.E.2d 502 (1960); Hucks v. Sellers,
236 S.C. 239, 113 S.E.2d 753 (1960); Echols v. Seaboard Coast Line Ry., 174 S.C. 537,
178 S.E. 139 (1935).
124. Watson v. Hall, 239 S.C. 109, 113, 121 S.E.2d 427, 429 (1961).
125. Carter v. Boyd Constr. Co., 255 S.C. 274, 280, 178 S.E.2d 536, 539 (1971).
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In 1974, the South Carolina Supreme Court considered two
cases where these elements were of primary importance. In
O'Shields v. Southern Fountain Mobile Homes, Inc.,'2 the pur-
chasers of a mobile home brought an action for damages resulting
from the seller's alleged misrepresentation as to the existence of
certain features which were to be included in the home pur-
chased. It appeared that the plaintiffs had examined a home on
the lot with certain features and had requested that the seller
order a similar home from the manufacturer with changes made
in accordance with the buyer's specifications. A contract of sale
was signed and the buyer paid a $200 deposit. When the home
arrived at the defendant's display lot, the plaintiffs came in,
inspected the home and, making no objections as to the mobile
home's suitability, paid the remainder of the purchase price. The
home was delivered to the plaintiffs' lot, all connections were
made and, once again, the plaintiffs made no comment with re-
spect to the absence of any features which they had expected to
receive. When the plaintiffs received their title from the manufac-
turer, however, they discovered that a "Vagabond" mobile home
had been sold to them rather than the "Plantation" which they
had ordered.
Although the Vagabond was a "cheaper" model than the
Plantation, it appeared that this difference in value was attribut-
able to the difference in the quality of the furnishings; in fact,
however, the O'Shields had ordered an unfurnished trailer. Nev-
ertheless, they brought suit alleging that the defendant had
shown them a home with an eight foot ceiling, swag lights, ex-
posed beams in the living room, and shag carpet in the hall; the
home they actually received had none of these features. The case
went to the jury and a verdict was returned for the plaintiffs. On
appeal, the supreme court reversed saying that all of the elements
of fraud had not been proved.
The reversal was based upon the plaintiffs' failure to prove
any justifiable reliance upon the alleged misrepresentation. Even
if the defendant had knowingly represented that the mobile home
sold to the O'Shields had the features in question, the O'Shields
had inspected the home they were to receive and were fully aware
that such features were not present. A person obviously does not
rely and has no right to rely on a representation which he knows
126. 262 S.C. 276, 204 S.E.2d 50 (1974).
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to be false. Even if the falsity is not actually known, it has been
held that a person has no right to rely on a misrepresentation if
the truth is easily within his reach.
12
1
In O'Shields, the evidence was insufficient to sustain a jury's
finding that all nine elements of fraud existed. Accordingly, the
trial judge erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed
verdict. In Young v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co.,2' however, the
opposite error was committed. There the lower court granted the
defendant's motion for a summary judgment holding that the
requisite elements of fraud could not be shown by any interpreta-
tion of the depositions before the court. The supreme court disa-
greed and held that a jury question was presented as to whether
the alleged misrepresentation was fraudulently made.
The action was premised upon a claim by the plaintiff that
he bought two automobile tires in reliance on the defendant's
representation that the tires were 40,000 mile radials. Both tires
were shown to be latently defective in that the plys separated
within the 40,000 mile guaranteed period." 9 At the time of the
purchase in question only two tire manufacturers, Sears and
Michelin, marketed a radial tire guaranteed for 40,000 miles. The
tires purchased by Young, which carried the brand name "Radial
990," were introduced by B. F. Goodrich to compete with the
Sears and Michelin radials. Although Goodrich guaranteed these
tires against defects in "workmanship or road hazard" 3 ' for the
life of the tire, the company did not authorize its dealers to give
a mileage warranty. Despite this lack of authorization, the Col-
umbia Goodrich store which sold the tires to Young gave an "in
store" guarantee that the tires were good for 40,000 miles, such
guarantee allegedly being based on the belief by the store's man-
agement that the Radial 990 was similar in quality to the Sears
and Michelin radials.
Without the "in store" guarantee, if a tire was found to be
defective, the purchaser could take the defective tire to any B. F.
127. Thomas v. Jeffcoat, 230 S.C. 126, 94 S.E.2d 240 (1956); Flowers v. Price, 190 S.C.
392, 3 S.E.2d 38 (1939); Whitman v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 107 S.C. 200, 92 S.E. 861
(1917); Mobley v. Quattlebaum, 101 S.C. 221, 85 S.E. 585 (1915).
128. 262 S.C. 445, 205 S.E.2d 185 (1974).
129. The supreme court opinion in Young did not give a detailed statement of the
facts of that case. The facts as given in this article are based on the depositions of the
plaintiff, Chalmers Young, and the manager of the Columbia Goodrich store, Jack Lanier.
These depositions are printed in the record for appeal.
130. Record at 31.
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Goodrich store and receive a new tire after paying an adjustment
charge based on tread wear. If the tread was unworn, the replace-
ment would be made without charge; if the tread was completely
worn out, no replacement would be made even if the tire had been
driven only 2,000 miles. With the addition, however, of the "in
store" 40,000 mile guarantee, if the purchaser brought a defective
tire back to the Columbia store, then the tire would be replaced
and the adjustment charge would be based on mileage, not tread
wear. Thus even if the tire were completely bald, if it had only
been driven 20,000 miles, the tire would be replaced for 50 percent
of the price of the new tire.
There was no evidence that the Columbia store refused to
honor this guarantee. The store offered to replace Mr. Young's
defective tires when he brought them in, making an adjustment
charge for the number of miles each tire had been driven. When
the last Radial 990 purchased by Young separated, however, he
refused this adjustment offer as being inadequate in light of cer-
tain consequential expenses he had incurred when the tires failed
on out-of-town trips. He subsequently sued alleging three causes
of action: fraud and deceit, breach of contract accompanied by
fraud, and breach of warranty.
Judge Harwell in the court below did not believe that the
facts were sufficient to sustain a cause of action in fraud and, in
response to the defendant's motion, granted the defendant a sum-
mary judgment as to the first two causes of action. His opinion
was primarily based on the plaintiff's apparent failure to show
that the representation was knowingly false when made in light
of the Goodrich manager's testimony that he believed "100 per-
cent" that the Radial 990 would go 40,000 miles. The supreme
court thought otherwise and reversed, holding that whether the
representation was fraudulent was an issue for the jury. This
result is arguably correct since a summary judgment can not be
granted if an issue of fact exists13 and, in this case at least, a
factual issue possibly existed with respect to the seller's knowl-
edge as to the truth or falsity of the representation. Although the
Goodrich manager asserted a belief that the tires would go 40,000
131. S.C. CIR. CT. R. 44(c) (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides in part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings and deposi-
tions, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
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miles, the fact that the home office did not authorize such a
guarantee suggests that the Radial 990 was known not to be good
for such a distance.
If the existence of a factual issue is to preclude summary
judgment, then the fact at issue must also be shown to be "mate-
rial.11112 In Young, the reversal of the summary judgment must
have been based additionally on the materiality of the "knowl-
edge" issue. Unfortunately, the supreme court did not identify
the defendant's "knowledge" as being the fact in dispute nor did
it explain why such a fact was material to the case.'33 The materi-
ality of the "knowledge" issue becomes apparent when Young's
action for breach of warranty is compared with his action for
fraud.
In Young, the representation that the tires were "40,000 mile
tires" constituted an express warranty that the tires would last
for that distance'34 and this warranty became part of the contract
of sale between the plaintiff and defendant.'35 It can be argued
that this warranty was breached when a defect rendered the tires
132. Id.
133. The full text of the supreme court opinion is as follows:
Plaintiff appeals from summary judgment for defendant in an action for
fraud and deceit in the sale of automobile tires. Judgment was awarded on
theory that deposition of plaintiff and of one of defendant's employees showed
that there was no fraud and that plaintiff had not suffered any damage. We
disagree. Plaintiff deposed that the tires were advertised by defendant's local
store as guaranteed for 40,000 mile radials, and that they were so represented
to him by the salesman with whom he dealt. This, they were not. In fact, the
defendant did not begin to market guaranteed 40,000 mile radials until some
eight months later. These tires carried only a warranty against defects and road
hazards which at the time of sale was applicable to all grades of Goodrich tires.
Whether the misrepresentation was fraudulently made is for determination by
a trial jury.
Obviously the tires were of less value than they would have been if guaran-
teed by defendant for 40,000 miles, and, under the applicable benefit of the
bargain rule, the difference in value is the measure of plaintiff's damages. Aaron
v. Hampton Motors, Inc., 240 S.C. 26, 124 S.E.2d 585 (1962).
Reversed.
262 S.C. at 445-46, 205 S.E.2d at 185-86.
134. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-313 (Spec. Supp. 1966) provides in part:
Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or prom-
ise.
135. "All express warranties are said to be 'part of a contract for sale.'" Hill,
Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 679, 695 (1973), citing
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 2.
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useless before they had been driven 40,000 miles. Thus the
"breach" was not dependent upon the sellers refusal to make an
adjustment.'36 The defendant's policy with respect to replacing
defective tires was a remedy for the breach voluntarily offered by
the defendant. The Columbia Goodrich store could have limited
its liability for breach of the 40,000 mile warranty by conditioning
the sale on an agreement with the buyer that his exclusive remedy
for breach of warranty would be replacement of any defective tire
with the buyer paying a mileage adjustment charge. 37 No such
limitation of remedy was agreed upon, however, and Young was
free to reject the remedy offered by the defendant and sue for the
remedies provided by the South Carolina Uniform Commercial
Code. Under section 2-714 of the UCC,'35 Young was entitled to
the difference between the actual value of the defective tires when
sold to him and "the value the tires would have had if they had
been as warranted.""'3 In addition, Young was probably entitled
to any incidental and consequential damages for the breach of
warranty under sections 2-714(3)" and 2-715.14'
136. The "time" of the breach might depend on the nature of the affirmation or
promise. If the warranty was to the effect that "the tires would last 40,000 miles," the
breach would occur when the tires failed prior to being driven 40,000 miles. If, however,
the warranty was to the effect that "the store would replace any tire found to be defective
with price adjustment based on 40,000 miles of expected use," then the breach would
occur when the replacement was refused.
137. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-719 (Spec. Supp. 1966) permits agreements between
buyer and seller which "limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this
Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to. . .repair and replacement of nonconform-
ing goods . . . ." Any remedy agreed on between the buyer and seller is optional unless
said remedy is "expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which cases it is the sole remedy."
Id.
138. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-714(2) (Spec. Supp. 1966) provides:
The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstan-
ces show proximate damages of a different amount.
139. Id.
140. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-714(3) (Spec. Supp. 1966) provides: "In a proper case any
incidental and consequential damages under the next section (§ 10.2-715) may also be
recovered."
141. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-715 (Spec. Supp. 1966) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include. . . any
commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with
effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other
breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or larticular requirements and needs
35
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Under the UCC, the defendant's liability under the 40,000
mile warranty was more extensive than anticipated. The defen-
dant's manager probably did not expect to be liable to suit unless
he refused to replace defective tires. The actual liability under
the warranty, however, extended to money damages measured by
differences in value plus any incidental and consequential dam-
ages. This result illustrates some of the unexpected consequences
which can flow from casually-given oral guarantees. If Goodrich
wanted to limit its liability to replacement of defective tires, then
it should have spelled out the terms of the warranty and the
remedies available, preferably in writing to avoid later disputes
over such terms.
The facts in Young which established a breach of warranty
also established most of the elements of fraud. Since a warranty
was given to induce the sale-a warranty that was subsequently
breached-there was apparently a false representation made with
the intent that Young rely on it and purchase the tires. Further-
more, since the defects in the tires were latent, this reliance on
the misrepresentation would seem justified. The only element of
fraud which could not be established by the breach of warranty
action was the element of the defendant's "knowledge" as to the
falsity of the representation. This factual issue, of course, was
material since proof of the "knowledge" element would transform
the warranty action where only actual damages were recovera-
ble12 into a fraud action where both actual and punitive damages
were recoverable.
43
Young v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co. could have been used by
the supreme court to warn merchants of the consequences of
of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and
which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach
of warranty.
142. See Holland v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal Co., 166 S.C. 455, 165 S.E. 203
(1932), where the court held that recovery for breach of contract is limited to the damages
which are a proximate result of the breach unless the breach of contract is accompanied
by fraud.
143. Actual damages are measured the same way for both fraud and breach of war-
ranty, i.e., the difference between the actual value of the goods when sold and the value
they would have had if they had been as warranted (represented) plus any incidential and
consequential damages. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.2-714, 10.2-715, and 10.2-721 (Spec.
Supp. 1966.); Lawson v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank of S.C., 255 S.C. 517, 180 S.E.2d
206 (1971). Punitive damages are also recoverable in an action for fraud. Bowen v. John-
son, 252 S.C. 423, 166 S.E.2d 766 (1969); Weatherford v. Home Fin. Co., 225 S.C. 313, 82
S.E.2d 196 (1954).
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using warranties as an inducement to a sale. A buyer should have
all the facts. If the seller intends the warranty to extend only to
replacement of the goods, then he should so inform the buyer at
the time of sale. Otherwise, if the warranty is breached, the buyer
can recover damages to the full extent allowed by the UCC de-
spite the unexpressed intention of the seller. The merchant who
uses warranties to induce sales also incurs the risk of liability for
fraud. If the warranty is breached, and it is shown that the seller
did not believe the goods to be of the quality warranted, '44 then
the seller may also be liable for both actual and punitive damages
in a fraud action. Commercial dealings should be based on honest
and full disclosure and the inducement of sales through the use
of false and misleading warranties should not be permitted. The
supreme court, however, chose not to deal with these policies in
Young, possibly reasoning that a discussion of merchant's liabili-
ties in an appeal from a summary judgment would be considered
superfluous dicta.
B. Fraudulent Conversion
In Perry v. United Insurance Co. of America,' an action
was brought for the fraudulent conversion of a check in the
amount of $86.10 representing the surrender value of a life in-
surance policy. Chessie Mae Perry was the named insured on a
$1,000 life insurance policy issued by the defendant insurance
company and was entitled under the policy to the cash surrender
value if she cancelled the policy. The beneficiary under the policy
was the plaintiffs mother, Maggie Campbell.
The policy was taken out by Perry at her mother's suggestion
144. See note 136 supra. The knowledge that the goods were not of the quality war-
ranted would apply to the first type of warranty mentioned in note 136. With respect to
the second type of warranty, the knowledge requirement of fraud would require proof that
the seller had no intention of replacing defective goods when he made that promise. An
exception to the general rule that fraud cannot be premised on unfulfilled promises is that
"fraud may be based on promises made with an intention not to perform the same."
Thomas & Howard Co. v. Fowler, 225 S.C. 354, 358, 82 S.E.2d 454, 456 (1954). Since proof
of intent not to fulfill a promise would probably be more difficult than proof of knowledge
as to quality, the second type of warranty illustrated in note 136 would be more protective
of the seller. A seller wishing to give a "repair or replacement" warranty should make sure
his intent is clearly expressed. Such a seller should avoid making specific affirmations as
to quality because the resulting express warranty might expose him to potential liability
both for breach of warranty and fraud despite his continuing willingness to "repair or
replace."
145. 262 S.C. 351, 204 S.E.2d 573 (1974).
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for the purpose of paying funeral expenses at Perry's death. The
policy was kept at Mrs. Campbell's home and both Mrs. Camp-
bell and her daughter contributed equally toward the premium
payments. Mrs. Campbell, however, later became very ill and
needed money to pay medical expenses. It became increasingly
difficult to make the premium payments required to keep certain
insurance policies in force, and Mrs. Campbell suggested that her
daughter cancel her $1,000 life insurance policy and apply for the
cash surrender value. The plaintiff acted on this suggestion and
United issued a check for $86.10 payable to the plaintiff. The
check was given to Herbert Benton, the staff manager of United's
Hartsville office, for delivery to the insured. Rather than taking
the check to Mrs. Perry, however, Benton went to Mrs. Camp-
bell's house with the check. He tried to sell her a fire insurance
policy with United Fire Insurance Company, an affiliate of the
defendant company, but Mrs. Campbell refused to purchase the
policy. Benton then offered to loan Mrs. Campbell some money
to help with her medical expenses and this offer was accepted.
Mrs. Campbell was unable to "sign a paper" in connection with
the loan, so Benton suggested that Mary Ann Perry, plaintiff's 15-
year-old daughter who was present and attending to her invalid
grandmother, sign for her. Mrs. Campbell agreed and Benton
placed the $86.10 check face down and instructed Mary Ann to
sign her mother's and grandmother's names on the "piece of
paper" which was not known by Mary Ann or Mrs. Campbell to
be a check. After Mary Ann signed as requested, Benton gave
Mrs. Campbell $23.10 and applied $51.30 as an advance premium
on the fire insurance policy which she had refused to buy, placing
the receipt for the premium payment with Mrs. Campbell's other
insurance papers without so informing her. The remaining $11.70
was apparently used by Benton to reimburse himself for prem-
iums he had advanced for policies held by either Mrs. Perry or
Mrs. Campbell. Having obtained a forged endorsement on the
check, Benton cashed it with the defendant company which then
deposited the check in its account.
When Mrs. Perry learned of this disposition of the check by
Benton, she immediately sought advice of coinsel. A suit was
later filed against United Insurance Company as principal and
Benton as agent seeking actual and punitive damages for Ben-
ton's fraudulent conversion of Mrs. Perry's check. At trial a jury
verdict of $86.10 actual damages and $5,000 punitive damages
1975]
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was returned against the defendants. After motions for a judg-
ment n.o.v. were denied by the trial judge, both defendants ap-
pealed.
The supreme court, after setting forth the facts given herein,
held that "there was abundant evidence to support a verdict for
actual and punitive damages against both defendants."'4 This
seems to be a just result in. light of these particular facts. Further
analysis, however, is required in order to identify the legal theo-
ries underlying this decision and to determine the broader hold-
ing of the case.
Since the cause of action in Perry was for "fraudulent conver-
sion," the meanings of the terms "conversion" and "fraud" as
used in the context of the case are of primary importance.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A defines conversion as "an
intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which
so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that
the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value
of the chattel."'47 This is a general definition of the tort of conver-
sion and seems to clearly apply to the facts in Perry. The
Restatement also provides more specific illustrations of ways in
which the tort is committed. Sections 223(f) and 235(1) taken
together would probably encompass the alleged act of conversion
in Perry. These sections provide that a conversion may be com-
mitted by an intentional unauthorized delivery of a chattel to a
person not entitled to its immediate possession and would subject
such a person to liability to another person who is entitled to
immediate possession. Mrs. Perry was entitled to possession of
the check; Benton had made an unauthorized delivery of the
check to a person not so entitled-he delivered the check to him-
self by fraudulently procuring a forged endorsement.
The Perry court held that a case for fraudulent conversion
was supported by the evidence. Such a holding would indicate
that Restatement sections 223(a) and 221(b), which apply to con-
version by fraud or duress, would apply more directly to the Perry
facts than sections 223(f) and 235(1) as indicated above. These
"conversion by fraud" sections provide that a conversion may be
committed by intentionally dispossessing another of a chattel by
fraud or duress. The comment to section 221(b) states that
146. Id. at 357, 204 S.E.2d at 575.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 222A (1965).
[Vol. 27
39
et al.: Torts
Published by Scholar Commons, 1975
TORTS
"[olne who by fraudulent representations induces another to
surrender the possession of a chattel to him has dispossessed the
other of the chattel." 4 ' These "conversion by fraud" sections,
however, cannot apply to the way in which the conversion was
committed against Mrs. Perry. No "fraudulent representations"
were made to Mrs. Perry; the fraud was perpetrated on Mrs.
Campbell and Mary Ann Perry. In addition, Mrs. Perry was never
in possession of the check such that she could be "dispossessed"
of it.
The sections of the Restatement previously cited have been
neither approved nor rejected by the South Carolina Supreme
Court. Although conversion has been defined in a number of
South Carolina cases,"' these definitions have been somewhat
general and have never been applied to such facts as were pre-
sented in Perry. The Restatement, although not authority on this
subject, is useful because it goes beyond the general definition of
conversion and describes various "ways" in which conversion can
be committed.
Another important element in the Perry case was the allega-
tion of "fraud." The concept of fraud in this context should be
distinguished from the action for fraudulent misrepresentations
which is discussed earlier in this article in terms of the nine
elements of proof. While fraudulent misrepresentation requires
proof of the nine elements by clear, cogent and convincing evi-
dence, ' other forms of fraud have been given more general defini-
tions such as "unfair dealings"15' or "the unlawful appropriation
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs, Explanatory Notes § 221(a), comment d at 428
(1965).
149. "[A] conversion is the unlawful exercise of dominion over the property of an-
other." Sherer-Gillete Co. v. Moore-Barnes Co., 114 S.C. 387, 389, 103 S.E. 766, 766
(1920). Conversion is "[a]n unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of owner-
ship over goods or personal chattels belonging to another or the alteration of their condi-
tion or the exclusion of an owner's rights." Castell v. Stephenson Fin. Co., 244 S.C. 45,
50, 135 S.E.2d 311, 313 (1964); Ray v. Pilgrim Health & Life Ins. Co., 206 S.C. 344, 347,
34 S.E.2d 218, 219 (1945); Powell v. A.K. Brown Motor Co., 200 S.C. 75, 78, 20 S.E.2d
636, 637 (1942); Neel v. Clark, 193 S.C. 412, 416, 8 S.E.2d 740, 742 (1940); Commercial
Credit Co. v. Cook, 165 S.C. 387, 392, 164 S.E. 17, 19 (1932). "Conversion is a tortious
act and 'may arise either by a wrongful taking of the chattel or by some other illegal
assumption of ownership, by illegally using or misusing it, or by wrongful detention.'"
Castell v. Stephenson Fin. Co., 244 S.C. 45, 50-51, 135 S.E.2d 311, 313 (1964); Young v.
Corbitt Motor Truck Co., 148 S.C. 511, 534, 146 S.E. 534, 542 (1928).
150. Watson v. Hall, 239 S.C. 109, 113, 121 S.E.2d 427, 429 (1961).
151. Daniel v. Post, 181 S.C. 468, 473, 187 S.E. 915, 917 (1936); Sullivan v. Calhoun,
117 S.C. 137, 139, 108 S.E. 189, 189 (1921).
1975]
40
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss3/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REviEw
of another's property by design.' 52 Some courts "content them-
selves with comparatively few general rules for [fraud's] discov-
ery and defeat, and allow the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case to bear heavily upon the conscience and judgment of
the court or jury in determining its presence or absence.'" 3 In
Perry, Benton's conduct in tricking the 15-year-old girl into forg-
ing an endorsement on the check was fraudulent under these
general definitions.
Although the allegation of fraud was not important in the
context of sections 223(f) and 235(1) of the Restatement, this
allegation was important in other respects. First, proof of fraud
indicated the presence of the "intention" required by
Restatement section 223. Conversion is committed when one
"intentionally" misdelivers a chattel under section 235. Benton's
fraudulent conduct in obtaining the forged endorsement clearly
indicated that the misdelivery was intentional. Secondly, the
presence of fraud in the conversion of the check'54 permitted the
plaintiff to recover punitive damages. There seems to be no ques-
tion that punitive damages are allowed where property is fraudu-
lently'55 or "knowingly and maliciously"'5 6 converted.
The result in Perry indicates a broader holding than is appar-
ent from an initial reading of the opinion. Although the supreme
court has allowed punitive damages to be imposed in cases in-
volving fraudulent conversions,'57 these previous cases have al-
ways involved a fraud perpetrated on the person from whom the
property is converted. In Perry, however, the fraud was not perpe-
trated on the plaintiff, but on a third party. Thus the broad
principle established by this case seems to be that punitive dam-
ages are recoverable in an action for conversion where fraud is
used in converting the property even if the fraud is perpetrated
against a person other than the plaintiff.
C. Odometer Tampering
On October 20, 1972, the Federal Motor Vehicle Information
152. See note 151 supra.
153. Id.
154. A check may be the subject of conversion. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW
OF TORT § 2.13 (1956).
155. Daniel v. Post, 181 S.C. 468, 187 S.E. 915 (1936).
156. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2.36 (1956). See also C.
McComicK, DAMAGES § 123, at 468 (1935).
157. Daniel v. Post, 181 S.C. 468, 187 S.E. 915 (1936).
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and Cost Savings Act' 5 was enacted, to become effective January
18, 1973. Subchapter IV of the Act'59 is designed to discourage
odometer tampering by providing both private damage actions'60
and government injunction actions'"' against persons who violate
its provisions.
Delay v. Heam Ford'6 2 is apparently one of the first cases to
arise under this Act and was decided by Judge Hemphill in re-
sponse to the defendant's motion for a summary judgment. Frank
Delay owned a 1967 Chevrolet which had approximately 72,000
miles on the odometer. Desiring to purchase a new car, he went
to Hearn Ford on December 23, 1972, and traded in his Chevrolet
on a new Ford. This new car required frequent repair work, and
the defendant replaced it with another new Ford. The replace-
ment car was also unsatisfactory and on January 19, 1973, Delay
sold the new Ford to the defendant's used car manager and repur-
chased the 1967 Chevrolet. On the way home from the used car
lot, however, Delay noticed that the odometer registered less than
49,000 miles.
After the defendant failed to provide an explanation for the
false odometer reading, Delay sued under 15 U.S.C. § 1989 seek-
ing a judgment for $1,500, costs, and attorneys fees.'63 Section
1989 imposes civil liability upon any person who, with intent to
defraud, violates any provision of subchapter IV. The provisions
allegedly violated by Hearn Ford were 15 U.S.C. § 1984 and 15
U.S.C. § 1988.
Section 1984 makes it unlawful to tamper with an odometer
"with the intent to change the number of miles thereon."'64 Since
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1909-91 (Supp. I, 1972).
159. 15 U.S.C. 99 1981-91 (Supp. II, 1972).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (Supp. II, 1972).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1990 (Supp. II, 1972).
162. 373 F. Supp. 791 (D.S.C. 1974).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 1989(a) (Supp. 1I, 1972) provides:
Any person who, with intent to defraud, violates any requirement imposed
under this subchapter shall be liable in an amount equal to the sum of-
(1) three times the amount of actual damages sustained or $1,500,
whichever is the greater; and
(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability,
the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as deter-
mined by the court.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 1984 (Supp. II, 1972) provides:
It is unlawful for any person or his agent to disconnect, reset, or alter the
odometer of any motor vehicle with the intent to change the number of miles
indicated thereon.
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the evidence indicated that Hearn Ford was in control of the
Chevrolet between the dates of sale and repurchase, a justifiable
inference arose that the defendant, through its agents, had rolled
back the odometer. Even if intent to defraud was clearly estab-
lished as required by section 1989, however, the violation of sec-
tion 1984 was not actionable unless the tampering was done on
or after January 18, 1973, .the effective date of the statute.
Section 198865 appeared to be the true basis of the plaintiffs
claim. That section directs the Secretary of Transportation to
prescribe rules requiring a transferor of a motor vehicle to disclose
to the transferee the actual mileage registered on the odometer
or, if the odometer reading is known to be inaccurate, disclose
that the actual mileage is unknown. When the Chevrolet was
resold to the plaintiff no disclosure statement was made, and a
violation of section 1988 was thus shown. 66
Although the violation of section 1984 probably occurred
prior to the effective date of the statute, this violation needed to
be shown nonetheless in order to establish that section 1988 had
been violated with the intent to defraud. The mere failure of the
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. II, 1972) provides:
(a) Not later than 90 days after October 20, 1972, the Secretary shall prescribe
rules requiring any transferor to give the following written disclosure to the
transferee in connection with the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle:
(1) Disclosure of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer.
(2) Disclosure that the actual mileage is unknown, if the odometer read-
ing is known to the transferor to be different from the number of miles
the vehicle has actually traveled.
Such rules shall prescribe the manner in which information shall be disclosed
under this section and in which such information shall be retained.
(b) It shall be a violation of this section for any transferor to violate any rules
under this section or to knowingly give a false statement to a transferee in
making any disclosure required by such rules.
166. Although section 1988 directed the Secretary to prescribe rules governing the
disclosure requirement of that section "not later than 90 days after October 20, 1972," the
Secretary's regulations were not issued until January 31, 1973, and did not become effec-
tive until March 1, 1973. The nonexistence of the regulations on the date of the alleged
violation (January 19, 1973), however, should not mean that section 1988 was not violated.
That section clearly established that disclosure of odometer mileage or the fact that the
true mileage was unknown was required. The rules, according to section 1938, were to
prescribe the "manner" in which the disclosure was to be made. On January 19, 1973,
therefore, Hearn Ford was not required to make the disclosure in any particular form, but
section 1988 seemed to require that disclosure be made in some form. The regulations,
which are now in force, require the transferor to furnish the transferee with a written
statement signed by the transferor containing the following information: (1) the odometer
reading at the time of transfer; (2) the date of transfer; (3) the transferor's name and
current address; (4) the make, model, body type, year, vehicle identification number, and
last plate number of the vehicle. 49 C.F.R. § 580.4 (1974).
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defendant to make the disclosures required by section 1988, al-
though establishing a violation of that section, does not establish
the requirement of section 1989 that the violation be made "with
intent to defraud." The violation of section 1984 (the tampering)
coupled with the violation of section 1988 (the nondisclosure),
however, establishes a strong case for intent to defraud. Judge
Hemphill stated that "[a]n intent to defraud arises from the
proof of [a change in the odometer reading and a failure to dis-
close the change] in the absence of an explanation [by the defen-
dant] .1111 A rebuttable presumption of fraudulent intent, there-
fore, is created by the violation of both sections 1984 and 1988.
The defendant's motion for summary judgment clearly had
to be denied. Three basic issues of fact were found to exist. First,
whether the defendant had altered the odometer in violation of
section 1984. Second, whether the defendant failed to make the
disclosures required by section 1988. Third, whether the requisite
intent to defraud was present so as to justify recovery under sec-
tion 1989.
The provisions of subchapter IV of the Motor Vehicle Infor-
mation and Cost Savings Act are designed to operate as a deter-
rent to the practice of altering odometers in order to defraud
purchasers of motor vehicles. '68 Under common law principles of
fraud and deceit, recovery against such tamperers would be diffi-
cult. Proof of the nine elements of fraud would be required and
the plaintiff would have to show such things as (1) the defen-
dant's knowledge that the mileage represented was false, (2) jus-
tifiable reliance on the representation, and (3) damages. '69 The
policy of the federal statute, however, is to "punish odometer
tamperers by imposing civil penalties upon them and to reward
purchasers who discover such tampering and bring it to the atten-
tion of the federal courts."' 70 The purchaser is not required to
prove that a false representation was knowingly made with the
intent to cause reliance on that representation. A claim is stated
if only one provision of the subsection is violated with the intent
to defraud and, as Delay indicates, such intent can be presumed
167. 373 F. Supp. at 796.
168. See 15 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. IH, 1972).
169. See, e.g., Aaron v. Hampton Motors, Inc., 240 S.C. 26, 124 S.E.2d 585 (1962)
where all of the requisite elements of fraudulent misrepresentation were shown where the
odometer on an automobile sold to plaintiff had been turned back from 55,000 to 16,000.
170. Delay v. Hearn Ford, 373 F. Supp. 791, 796 (D.S.C. 1974).
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if both tampering and nondisclosure are shown. No justifiable
reliance on the mileage represented by the odometer is required
under the statute as it would be in an action for fraud and deceit.
Delay also illustrates the absence of the justifiable reliance re-
quirement. Frank Delay could not have maintained an action for
fraud and deceit since he repurchased his own car and thus ob-
viously did not rely, and had no right to rely, on the odometer
reading. The absence of a damage requirement indicates that the
purpose of the statute is primarily preventive rather than reme-
dial. The drafters' purpose was to "establish a national policy
against odometer tampering and prevent consumers from being
victimized by such abuses." '' Section 1989 seems designed to
punish more than to remedy. That section permits recovery for
three times the amount of damages or $1,500, whichever is
greater, plus costs of the action and attorney fees. 72 There was no
indication that Frank Delay incurred any damages when he re-
purchased the 1967 Chevrolet, yet he was permitted to sue for
$1,500, and he could bring the action in either state or federal
court.'
Even though the statute can operate as a strong deterrent to
odometer tampering, Judge Hemphill suggests a method of
strengthening that deterrent. In a footnote to the opinion, he
states that "perhaps the statute should be amended to require the
seller to supply the prospective purchaser with the names, ad-
dresses, and telephone numbers of the previous owners so that
one can check to make sure that no tampering has occurred."' 74
But of course, as Judge Hemphill says, such "is a matter for
Congress, not the courts.' ' 75
D. Defamation
The issue presented in Thornton v. New South Life Ins. Co.176
was whether an action for libel could be maintained against the
171. 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3960, 3962 (1972) (emphasis added).
172. See note 163 supra.
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1989(b) (Supp. 11, 1972) provides:
An action to enforce any liability created under . ..this section, may be
brought in a United States district court without regard to the amount in contro-
versy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within two years from the
date on which the liability arises.
174. 373 F. Supp. at 796 n.6.
175. Id.
176. 262 S.C. 651, 207 S.E.2d 88 (1974) (per curiam).
[Vol. 27
45
et al.: Torts
Published by Scholar Commons, 1975
TORTS
defendant, a consumer credit reporting agency, for giving false
information regarding the plaintiff's prior employment to his po-
tential employer. This issue had to be resolved in light of the
credit agency's defense that its report was protected from a libel
claim by a "qualified privilege."17 1 Under this privilege, the
agency is immune from liability for reporting false statements if
the "inquiries are honestly made and the information is furnished
to subscribers in good faith." ' 8
John Thornton, the plaintiff in the case, was an agent of New
South Life Insurance Company. After that employment relation-
ship was terminated, Thornton applied for a position with the
Peninsula Insurance Company.7 9 Peninsula requested that the
defendant, Retail Credit Company, prepare a report on the plain-
tiff's employment background. Accordingly, Retail Credit con-
ducted an investigation which yielded a rather unfavorable report
regarding the quality of Thornton's work at New South Life.
Upon leaning that a derogatory report had been sent to Peninsula,
Thornton went to the local office of Retail Credit in order to
examine the report. While discussing the contents of the report
at length with the branch manager, he discovered that some of
the information in the report was incorrect. As a result of this
discussion, the information was rechecked and apparently a sec-
ond report was sent to Peninsula which corrected the complained-
of errors. Thornton's application for employment with Peninsula,
however, was rejected and he subsequently sued Retail Credit for
libel alleging that it caused "false and misleading statements to
be published to [his] prospective employers."' 80 Retail Credit
177. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 115 (4th ed. 1971). The qualified privilege
of mercantile credit agencies appears to be based on the idea that commercial and busi-
ness institutions in general require quick, confidential credit information upon which to
base their everyday business decisions. Such mercantile credit agencies aid and assist in
the smooth and quick flow of commerce which is in the best interest of all the public and
removal of the qualified privilege might impede the credit agencies' ability to quickly
report to such institutions because of fear of liability for inaccurate reports. Thus, in the
majority of states within the United States, the qualified privilege is recognized for credit
reporting agencies where their inquiries are honestly made and the information is made
to subscribers in good faith. A minority of the states follow the English rule which does
not recognize the qualified privilege on the ground that such agencies are mere business
ventures which trade for profit the characters of other people. Id. at 790.
178. Id. at 790.
179. Those facts not included in the supreme court's opinion were obtained from the
depositions included in the record on appeal. The opinion did not identify the prospective
employer as Peninsula Insurance Company.
180. Record at 6.
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answered that the information contained in the report was quali-
fiedly privileged because it was "furnished . . . in the regular
course of its ...business as a mercantile or credit reporting
agency, . . . in good faith, in the belief of the truth thereof, with-
out malice and only to ...its customers who . had made
inquir[ies] .. "I After depositions of the plaintiff and the
defendant's employees had been taken, the defendant moved for
a summary judgment on the ground that the essential element
of malice could not be reasonably inferred from the evidence. The
motion was granted and Thornton appealed.
The supreme court agreed with the trial judge in holding that
the evidence introduced by the plaintiff could not support, as a
matter of law, an inference of malice or reckless disregard on
behalf of the agency; the court also stated that the evidence could
not support a finding of mere negligence on the part of the
agency. 8 ' By so deciding the supreme court was not required to
consider the issue raised by the plaintiff-whether recovery for
libel should be granted for the negligent preparation of such a
report. For the same reason, it declined the plaintiff's request
that it modify or overrule the case of Cullum v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., ' 3 which had held that a communication in a retail credit
report was qualifiedly privileged unless malice was shown. 1 Such
a response by the court was correct for its finding that the plain-
tiff had not presented evidence sufficient to support even a find-
ing of negligence precluded consideration of the Cullum decision;
a discussion of Cullum could only be classified as dictum under
these circumstances. The supreme court, while recognizing that
Thornton was not a case in which they might reconsider Cullum,
did state in passing that they had not construed the Cullum
decision to preclude recovery unless actual malice could be shown
but suggested that extreme gross negligence might well amount
to "implied malice" under certain circumstances. 5
Although the court was not forced to consider the plaintiff's
contention that negligence rather than malice should be the stan-
181. Id. at 16.
182. 262 S.C. 651, 653, 207 S.E.2d 88, 89 (1974).
183. 228 S.C. 384, 90 S.E.2d 370 (1955).
184. Plaintiff had argued that the Cullum decision should be modified or overruled
to the extent that: (1) it required proof of actual malice and not implied malice and (2) it
did not allow recovery upon proof of either simple negligence or gross negligence. 262 S.C.
651, 653, 207 S.E.2d 88, 89 (1974).
185. Id.
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dard of liability in the area of retail credit reporting, it may be of
interest to consider the plaintiff's reasoning. Thornton argued
that the malice requirement was harsh and resulted in injustice
to the individual who was the subject of a false report. He argued
further as follows:
The Appellant has been denied employment opportunities and,
therefore, loss of income. The loss was not occasioned by any
misconduct on behalf of the Appellant. There can be no logical
reason for holding that the agent who negligently prepares a
report is any less liable for the consequences of his acts than the
agent who negligently drives his automobile and inflicts per-
sonal injury.'86
This argument would be very persuasive if the only remedy avail-
able to an individual injured by a false report was a common law
suit for libel. Since 1971, however, a federal statutory remedy has
been available to individuals who are damaged by a credit
agency's dissemination of false information.'87 This federal stat-
ute, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, required Peninsula (if a credit
report were the basis of the denial of Thornton's employment) to
notify '88 Thornton of the existence of the report and the name of
the consumer reporting agency.' 9 Thereafter, Thornton had the
186. Brief for Appellant at 10.
187. These remedies are provided by the Fair Credit Reporting Act which went into
effect on April 25, 1971, and is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970). One of the considera-
tions which led to the passage of this Act was the inadequacy of the common law defama-
tion action in cases where a false report had been issued by a credit reporting agency. This
consideration has been expressed as follows:
Aggravating [the problem resulting from the use of obsolete information]
was the inability of a person injured by a false or misleading report to recover
damages in a defamation action. Virtually every jurisdiction recognized the
doctrine that reports furnished in good faith to parties having a legitimate
interest in the information reported possess a qualified privilege which is not lost
simply because the report contains some inaccurate or defamatory matter. The
consumer injured by such a report could defeat the privilege only by showing
that the report had been furnished out of malice or supplied to persons with no
legitimate interest in the information. Since these facts were usually absent, the
agencies were effectively insulated from liability for defamation.
Note, The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 56 MINN. L. REv. 819, 823 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
188. It is not clear from the record whether the plaintiff was notified by Peninsula of
the adverse credit report or whether he learned of the report from other sources.
189. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever . . . employment involving a consumer is denied . . . either
wholly or partly because of information contained in a consumer report from a
consumer reporting agency, the user of the consumer report shall so advise the
consumer against whom such adverse action had been taken and supply the
48
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss3/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
statutory right to examine the report 9' and to dispute any infor-
mation contained therein.'91 Once such a dispute had arisen, Re-
tail Credit was then required to reinvestigate and to delete any
information found to be inaccurate.'92 In addition, Retail Credit
was required, upon Thornton's request, to notify Peninsula of the
deletion of the inaccurate information within a reasonable period
of time.'93
name and address of the consumer reporting agency making the report.
190. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) (1970) provides:
Every consumer reporting agency shall, upon request and proper identifica-
tion of any consumer, clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer:
(1) The nature and substance of all information. . . in its files on the
consumer at the time of the request.
(2) The sources of the information; except that the sources of informa-
tion acquired solely for use in preparing an investigative consumer report
and actually used for no other purpose need not be disclosed: Provided,
That in the event an action is brought under this subchapter, such
sources shall be available to the plaintiff under appropriate discovery
procedures in the court in which the action is brought.
(3) The recipients of any consumer report on the consumer which it has
furnished-
(A) for employement purposes within the two-year period pre-
ceding the request, and
(B) for any other purpose within the six-month period preceding
the request.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) (1970) provides:
If the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in his
file is disputed by a consumer, and such dispute is directly conveyed to the
consumer reporting agency by the consumer, the consumer reporting agency
shall within a reasonable period of time reinvestigate and record the current
status of that information unless it has reasonable grounds to believe that the
dispute by the consumer is frivolous or irrelevant. If after such reinvestigation
such information is found to be inaccurate or can no longer be verified, the
consumer reporting agency shall promptly delete such information. The pres-
ence of contradictory information in the consumer's file does not in and of itself
constitute reasonable grounds for believing the dispute is frivolous or irrelevant.
192. Id.
193. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(d) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Following any deletion of information which is found to be inaccurate or
whose accuracy can no longer be verified or any notation as to disputed informa-
tion, the consumer reporting agency shall, at the request of the consumer, fur-
nish notification that the item has been deleted . . . . The consumer reporting
agency shall clearly and conspicuously disclose to the consumer his rights to
make such a request. Such disclosure shall be made at or prior to the time the
information is deleted or the consumer's statement regarding the disputed infor-
mation is received.
It appears from the record that the "reasonable time" involved in this particular situation
was approximately three weeks from the date of plaintiff's request until notification of
Peninsula.
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Not only does this Act permit, in most instances, '94 the indi-
vidual to correct false information concerning his credit rating,
but it also provides for recovery of damages from those who vio-
late its provisions. The consumer reporting agency or the user of
the information is liable for actual damages and attorney's fees
for negligent violations of the aforementioned requirements'95
and, if the violation is willful, this liability also includes punitive
damages. 9' Such an act should greatly enhance the protection of
individuals from inaccurate credit reports and should also
194. Although the Act does provide a remedy in many instances where the common
law would not, there are still some situations in which the statutory remedy proves insuffi-
cient. Two such examples one might conceive are (1) the undiscovered cause of action
situation and (2) the time-lag situation. In the first situation the Act, which requires the
user of the consumer report to inform (under threat of monetary penalty for doing other-
wise) the individual who has been adversely affected by the inaccurate credit report, does
not establish an effective method of insuring that such a user will in fact inform such
person. It will be very difficult for the adversely affected party to find out if he has received
an adverse credit reporting of which he was not informed and even more difficult to prove
that the user did not deny employment for reasons other than the adverse report. The
time-lag situation also presents a problem under the Act since the credit agency is allowed
a "reasonable time" in which to reinvestigate a questionably inaccurate report and notify
the user of such inaccuracies; there is no requirement, however, that the user sit idly by
and refuse to fill a personnel vacancy within his organization which may require his
immediate action. Whether the plaintiff in Thornton was subject to a time-lag dilemma
is unclear from the record, but the supreme court seemed to imply that the inaccurate
information supplied to the user could have had only an adverse effect of negligible
proportions so that the decision by the user to employ could not have been affected by
the inaccuracies even if they had not been corrected by the credit agency. 262 S.C. 651,
653, 207 S.E.2d 88, 89.
195. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (1970) provides:
Any consumer reporting agency or user of information which is negligent
in failing to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with
respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the
sum of-
(1) Any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the
failure;
(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability under this
section, the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney's fees
as determined by the court.
196. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1970) provides:
Any consumer reporting agency or user of information which willfully fails
to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to
any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of-
(1) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the
failure;
(2) such amount of punitive damages as the court may allow; and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability under this
section, the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney's fees
as determined by the court.
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weaken the arguments of subsequent plaintiffs that the Cullum
rule of qualified privilege for credit agencies should be overruled
in order to establish an adequate remedy for the victimized indi-
vidual of an inaccurate credit report.
E. Funeral and Burial'Rights
Judge Hemphill, in a federal action based on diversity of
citizenship, 9 ' recognized the existence of two new torts in Tully
v. Pate.' Although Georgia law was applied in that case, it is
nevertheless interesting to examine the decision both because of
the theories presented and because it was decided by a federal
judge of the South Carolina district. The new torts discussed were
the "intentional interference with burial rights" and the "inten-
tional interference with the privilege or right to attend the funeral
of a member of one's immediate family." 199
Daniel and Valeria Tully were husband and wife but were
involved in divorce proceedings in which the custody of their five
minor children was at issue. During the pendency of these pro-
ceedings, Valeria and her two youngest children left their Georgia
home for Cashiers, North Carolina, for a Thanksgiving visit with
some relatives. Unfortunately, the two children lost their lives
and Valeria Tully was seriously injured in a tragic fire which
occurred during their holiday visit. Upon learning of the fire,
Daniel Tully went to North Carolina to assist in the burial ar-
rangements taking the three older children with him.
After Daniel's arrival, however, Valeria's sister, Eula H.
Pate, informed him that the funeral plans had been made; the
children would be buried in the Pate family plot in Fort Gaines,
Georgia, in accordance with his wife's wishes. She also told him
that the funeral would be held at 2:00 P.M. on February 10, 1970,
and that he had no legal right to participate in the burial arrange-
ments. Thereafter, however, while Daniel Tully was in the pro-
cess of obtaining a temporary restraining order to delay the fu-
neral until the burial rights of the husband and wife could be
determined, the hour of the funeral was changed so that it began
several hours earlier than originally planned. Consequently, he
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
198. 372 F. Supp. 1064 (D.S.C. 1973). Although this survey is intended to cover only
cases decided in 1974, this case is included because it was decided on December 21, 1973,
and was not included in last year's survey.
199. Id. at 1070.
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and the three surviving children, not being informed of the
change, missed the funeral.
Subsequently, Daniel Tully, who is a South Carolina resi-
dent, brought this federal diversity action against Eula Pate to
recover damages arising from her allegedly intentional interfer-
ence with his burial rights and with his right to attend the fu-
neral. In response to the defendant's motion for a summary judg-
ment, Judge Hemphill handed down a lengthy opinion outlining
the issues presented by the motion. The important issues for the
purpose of this survey involved the recognition of two new
intentional torts-"interference with burial rights" and "interfer-
ence with the right to attend the funeral of a member of one's
immediate family."
The motion for summary judgment for the defendant was
granted with respect to the interference with burial rights because
the plaintiff had no such rights with which the defendant could
interfere. A Georgia court had awarded custody of the two young-
est children to the mother and she had such custody at the time
of the fire."0 Judge Hemphill, following other decisions rendered
by Georgia courts, found that the parent having custody of the
children at the time of death had the right to make the burial
plans. Since Valeria was the holder of these rights, Eula Pate,
while acting as the wife's agent in making the funeral arrange-
ments, could not have interfered with any such rights of the
plaintiff.
South Carolina would probably also recognize an intentional
interference with burial rights as a tort. The supreme court has
held that while "no one has a property right in a corpse, it [a
corpse] is quasi-property over which relatives of the deceased
have some right."20' Accordingly, if the supreme court accepts
Judge Hemphill's statement that "a course of action constitutes
a prima facie tort if there is an intentional interference with the
property rights of another without justifiable cause,"2 2 then it
should follow that an intentional interference with "quasi-
property" rights would also be tortious.
200. At the time of the fire, an order granting custody of the two younger children to
Valeria had not been issued. In accordance with an earlier recommendation of the juvenile
investigation report, however, custody of the two children was granted to the mother in
an order nunc pro tunc as of a date prior to the fire.
201. Simpkins v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 200 S.C. 228, 232, 20 S.E.2d 733, 735
(1942).
202. 372 F. Supp. at 1071.
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With respect to the plaintiff's action for intentional interfer-
ence with his right to attend his children's funeral, the motion for
summary judgment was denied. Two issues of fact remained: (1)
whether the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs
right to attend the funeral and (2) if there was such an intentional
interference, whether the plaintiff suffered any measurable dam-
ages for which compensation could be awarded. The defendant
claimed that she was entitled to a summary judgment as a matter
of law on the grounds that the plaintiff suffered no injury by his
nonattendance at the funeral. Judge Hemphill, however, rejected
this argument stating that the emotional distress suffered by the
plaintiff could be considered by the jury as an element of dam-
ages. He further stated that such mental damages could be con-
sidered even in the absence of any accompanying physical bodily
injury. In support of this statement he cited Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 46(1) as follows:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is sub-
ject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm
to the other results from it, for such bodily harm."3
The reliance on this Restatement section is misplaced. Sec-
tion 46 permits recovery of damages for severe emotional distress
in the absence of accompanying bodily injury if such emotional
distress was intentionally or recklessly inflicted. There is no lan-
guage in the Tully opinion, however, which indicates that such a
claim was made. To the contrary, rather than dealing with the
tort called "intentional infliction of emotional distress," Judge
Hemphill stated that the plaintiff's claim was based on a "new
tort" called "intentional interference with the right to attend a
family member's funeral." There is a significant distinction be-
tween these two torts. The former involves actual intent to create
mental distress; the latter involves intent to interfere with a right
or privilege of the plaintiff which may unintentionally result in
mental distress. The more appropriate Restatement section ap-
pears to be section 47 which states the following rule:
Except as stated in . . . § 46, conduct which is tortious
because intended to result in . . . the invasion of [another's]
legally protected interests does not make the actor liable for an
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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emotional distress which is the only legal consequence of his
conduct. 04
If Eula Pate did not intend to inflict emotional distress, but only
intended to interfere with the plaintiff's right to attend the fu-
neral, section 47 would seem to apply rather than section 46.
The application of section 47 would make the defendant's
argument for summary judgment more persuasive. Under that
section, if the defendant's conduct was tortious solely because it
invaded the plaintiff's right to attend his children's funeral, then
"the tortious quality of the act [was] insufficient to create liabil-
ity for emotional distress alone. ' 25 It was both unnecessary and
unwise for the plaintiff to seek recovery for a new tort called
intentional interference with the right to attend a funeral. The
plaintiff's case would have been stronger had it been alleged that
the defendant, by keeping him from the funeral, had intended to
inflict emotional distress. If this allegation had been made, the
application of section 46 would have been appropriate, and recov-
ery for mental suffering in the absence of bodily injury would be
proper.
Although the general rule in South Carolina states that there
can be no recovery for mental suffering in the absence of bodily
injury,00 there appears to be an exception to this rule in cases
involving burial rights. In Lanford v. West Oakwood Cemetery
Addition, Inc. ,2o7 the plaintiff was the undisputed owner of eight
burial plots where three members of her family had already been
buried and where she intended that the other members of the
family, including herself, would also be buried. The defendant,
the corporate owner of the cemetery, negligently sold four of the
remaining five plots to strangers and two of these plots were used
for burial of the strangers' relatives. The plaintiff alleged that she
suffered mental anguish resulting from the use of the family plots
by strangers, but there was no allegation that any bodily injury
was suffered. In his charge, the trial judge instructed the jury
"that mental anguish would be an element which they could
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 47 (1965).
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 47, comment a at 80
(1965).
206. Norris v. Southern Ry.-Carolina Div., 84 S.C. 15, 65 S.E. 956 (1909); Black v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 82 S.C. 478, 64 S.E. 418 (1909); Taylor v. Atlantic Coast Line
Ry., 78 S.C. 552, 59 S.E. 641 (1907).
207. 223 S.C. 350, 75 S.E.2d 865 (1953).
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consider in arriving at the amount of their verdict."2 ' This charge
was approved by the supreme court on appeal. Thus, the import
of this decision is that the South Carolina rule goes beyond that
expressed in Tully v. Pate. While, in Tully, mental suffering was
an appropriate element of damages resulting from intentional
violations of the plaintiffs rights, the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Lanford indicated its willingness to go a step further. In
that case, mental suffering without accompanying bodily injury
was an appropriate element of damages when the interference
with the plaintiffs burial plans was merely negligent.29
F. False Imprisonment
Hemmerle v. K-Mart Discount Stores"' was a federal diver-
sity" ' action against a pharmacist (and his employer) for his par-
ticipation in an apparent custodial interrogation of the plaintiff
by the police regarding a prescription for narcotic drugs. The
prescription was presented to the pharmacist under very suspi-
cious circumstances212 and therefore he suspected that it might be
forged. Consequently, he summoned the police as he had been
directed by the Narcotic and Drug Control Division of the State
Board of Health. When the police arrived at the K-Mart phar-
macy, they detained the plaintiff for approximately ten minutes
while they questioned her about the prescription. After the pre-
scription was found to have been validly issued,213 the plaintiff
208. Id. at 354, 75 S.E.2d at 866.
209. This result is contrary to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) which
states: "If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing
either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, without bodily harm or other
compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance."
210. 383 F. Supp. 303 (D.S.C. 1974).
211. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). The suit was first brought in
state court, but was removed to federal court after the plaintiff moved to Florida.
212. The prescription in question was one of two which had been issued to patients
living at the same address by the same doctor in Bamberg, some 60 miles from the K-
Mart store which was in Columbia. The pharmacist noticed that the name of the drug on
one of the prescriptions was misspelled and also that the license tag on the patients' car
was missing. He relayed these facts to the Narcotic and Drug Control Division of the State
Board of Health, and this agency called the Bamberg doctor who did not recall issuing
the prescriptions. The agency then instructed the pharmacist to call the police when the
patients returned to obtain the remainder of a prescription which the pharmacist had only
partially filled.
213. The Bamberg doctor had issued the prescription despite his contrary recollec-
tions which were stated to the agency. His failure to recall issuing it seemed to result in
part from the actions of the patients in falsifying their addresses. The addresses on the
[Vol. 27
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brought suit alleging that she had been falsely detained and had
"felt she was under arrest." '214
After a jury trial, District Judge Chapman granted the defen-
dants' motion for a directed verdict holding that the plaintiff had
failed to establish a case of false imprisonment. In support of this
result, Judge Chapman reaffirmed the principles presented in
Wingate v. Postal Telegraph& Cable Co.215 In Wingate, the South
Carolina Supreme Court distinguished between informing a po-
lice officer that a person may have committed a crime and ac-
tually directing a policeman to arrest the alleged offender. In the
former situation, a person has not only a right but also a duty to
provide law enforcement authorities with information regarding
the possible commission of a crime. Under such circumstances,
the informant will not be liable for false imprisonment even if the
subsequent arrest by the police officer is unlawful.2 6 In the latter
situation, a complaint is made to peace officers that a certain
individual has engaged in illegal activity and this complaint is
followed by a request that the officer arrest the offender. Here,
the complaining party will be liable for false imprisonment to the
person so arrested if the arrest is unlawful.
21 7
prescriptions indicated that the patients lived in or near Bamberg. When the narcotics
director called the doctor, however, he indicated that the patients lived near Columbia.
214. 383 F. Supp. at 305. The action was brought for false arrest and false imprison-
ment. False arrest, however, appears to be only a means of accomplishing a false imprison-
ment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 45A, comment b at 69
(1965). The plaintiff's feeling that she was under arrest was important in establishing the
"confinement" element of false imprisonment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Ex-
planatory Notes § 41, comment b at 62 (1965). For the rules regarding actions for false
imprisonment see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 35-45A (1965).
215. 204 S.C. 520, 30 S.E.2d 307 (1944).
216. The Wingate court stated this rule as follows:
Where a person merely directs the attention of a police officer to what he sup-
poses to be a breach of the peace, or gives to such officer facts indicating such,
and the officer, without other direction, arrests the offender on his own responsi-
bility, the person who did nothing more than communicate the facts to the
officer is not liable for causing the arrest, even though it is made without a
warrant. Where a person has information or knowledge that the law has been
violated, he not only has a right, but frequently it is his duty, to communicate
such information or facts to the proper officer so as to give such officer the
opportunity, if in his judgment it is proper to do so, to take whatever steps may
be necessary to apprehend the offender.
Id. at 528, 30 S.E.2d at 310-11 (citations omitted).
217. The language used by the Wingate court with respect to liability for false impris-
onment in this situation is as follows:
[lit is ...well settled that where a private person induces an officer by
request, direction or command to unlawfully arrest another, he is liable for false
1975]
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In accordance with the distincition presented in Wingate, the
defendant in Hemmerle was not liable. He merely relayed the
suspicious information to the proper health authorities who
thereupon directed him to call the police. After the arrival of the
police, the defendant did not request them to arrest the plaintiff
but merely supplied them with the facts which made him suspect
the prescription to be a forgery. Judge Chapman concluded his
opinion as follows:
[The actions of the defendants] were not only appropriate,
but required under the circumstances. The defendant Green
[pharmacist] and his employer should be praised and not criti-
cized for his actions in this matter. It is a shame that they have
been harassed with law suits as groundless as this one." 8
III. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Tort Liability Through Agency Relationship
As a general rule, if an employer has the right to control the
physical activities of his employee, a master-servant relationship
is said to exist2"9 and, under the principle of respondeat superior,
the master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant committed
within the scope of the servant's employment.22 ° On the other
hand, the employer is not liable for the negligent acts of an inde-
pendent contractor whom the employer has engaged to accom-
plish a certain task, but over whom the employer has no right of
control as to the physical activities of the independent contrac-
tor." One of the issues presented in Proctor v. Colonial Refriger-
ated Transportation, Inc."' was whether a truck driver employed
by the defendant, an interstate motor carrier certified by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, was a servant or an indepen-
imprisonment. The charge of false imprisonment is not confined to the party
who unlawfully seizes or restrains another, but is likewise extended to any
person who may cause, instigate or procure an unlawful arrest.
Id. at 528, 30 S.E.2d at 311. For a discussion of the importance of the fact that the arrest
must be "unlawful" for a cause of action for false imprisonment to be stated see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 45A, comment b at 69 (1965).
218. 383 F. Supp. at 307.
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958).
220. H. HENN, AGENCY-PARTNERSHIP AND OTHER UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES 132-33 (1972).
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, Explanantory Notes § 2, comment b at 13-
14 (1958).
222. 494 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1974).
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dent contractor. In Proctor, the defendant-carrier, Colonial Re-
frigerated Transporation, leased a tractor from one E. 0. Bales
pursuant to a written agreement in which Bales agreed to drive
the tractor and transport commodities in trailers owned by the
defendant. A similar agreement was made with the plaintiff,
James Proctor. When Proctor's tractor was placed in a shop for
repairs, however, Bales hired Proctor as an assistant driver for a
haul from Maryland to Florida. While they were passing through
South Carolina with Bales at the wheel, the tractor-trailer was
involved in an accident in which Bales was killed and Proctor was
seriously injured.
Proctor then sued the carrier (Colonial) alleging that it was
responsible for the negligent driving of its servant, Bales. The
action was brought in federal district court under the diversity
statute223 and was tried before a jury, resulting in a verdict for the
defendant. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiff alleged
that the trial judge erred in giving the following instruction:
I charge you that if you determine that the relationship
between Mr. Bales, the driver of the defendant vehicle, and the
defendant, was that of independent contractor-employer at the
time of the accident in question, you must return a verdict for
the defendant, because under the law this defendant is not re-
sponsible for negligent, or reckless, or willful or wanton acts
committed by persons it has engaged or employed to perform
independent services.
However, should you determine that the relationship be-
tween Bales and the defendant was that of master-servant,...
plaintiff would be entitled to recover, if plaintiff has proved by
a preponderance of the evidence that the deceased, Bales, oper-
ated the defendant's vehicle in a negligent, or reckless manner
which proximately contributed to and caused the wreck in
issue."'
The court of appeals agreed with the plaintiff's contention that
such instruction was reversible error and, therefore, reversed and
remanded for a new trial. Judge Field, writing for the court, held
that, as a matter law, Bales was a servant of Colonial rather than
an independent contractor. This holding was primarily based on
the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act codified as 49
223. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
224. 494 F.2d at 90 n.1.
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U.S.C. § 304(e) 25 and on the regulations promulgated thereunder.
Section 1057.4 of these regulations28 governs lease agree-
ments such as the one between Bales and Colonial and requires
that the lessee-carrier assume complete responsibility in respect
to the use of the leased equipment. Thus, this section forecloses
the carrier's defense that the lessor-driver was an independent
contractor and in effect makes him a "statutory employee.
'221
Although these provisions have been previously used to deny
the independent contractor status of lessor-drivers whose negli-
gence results in some injury to a member of the traveling pub-
lic,228 Proctor was a case of first impression as to whether, by use
225. 49 U.S.C. § 304(e) (1970) provides as follows:
Subject to the provisions of subsection (f) of this section, the Commission is
authorized to prescribe, with respect to the use by motor carriers (under leases,
contracts, or other arrangements) of motor vehicles not owned by them, in the
furnishing of transportation of property-
(1) regulations requiring that any such lease, contract, or other arrange-
ment shall be in writing and be signed by the parties thereto, shall specify
the period during which it is to be in effect, and shall specify the compen-
sation to be paid by the motor carrier, and requiring that during the
entire period of any such lease, contract, or other arrangement a copy
thereof shall be carried in each motor vehicle covered thereby; and
(2) such other regulations as may be reasonably necessary in order to
assure that while motor vehicles are being so used the motor carriers will
have full direction and control of such vehicles and will be fully responsi-
ble for the operation thereof in accordance with applicable law and regu-
lations, as if they were the owners of such vehicles, including the require-
ments prescribed by or under the provisions of this chapter with respect
to safety of operation and equipment and inspection thereof, which re-
quirements may include but shall not be limited to promulgation of regu-
lations requiring liability and cargo insurance covering all such equip-
ment.
226. 49 C.F.R. § 1057.4 (1974) provides in pertinent part as follows:
[A]uthorized carriers may perform authorized transportation in or with equip-
ment which they do not own only under the following conditions:
(a) Contract Requirements. The contract, lease, or other arrangement for
the use of such equipment: . . .(4) . . . [s]hall provide for the exclusive
possession, control, and use of the equipment and for the complete as-
sumption of responsibility in respect thereto, by the lessee for the dura-
tion of said contract, lease or other arrangement ....
227. Brannaker v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 428 S.W.2d 524, 535 (Mo.
1968). See also Cox v. Bond Transp., Inc., 53 N.J. 186, 249 A.2d 579 (1969), where the
term "statutory employee" was used in connection with the statutory requirement that
the carrier assume complete responsibility with respect to equipment leased from the
driver.
228. See, e.g., Turnbow v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 15 Ill. App. 2d 57, 145 N.E.2d
377 (1957); Brannaker v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 428 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. 1968);
Cox v. Bond Transp., Inc., 53 N.J. 186, 249 A.2d 579 (1969); National Trailer Convoy, Inc.
v. Saul, 375 P.2d 922 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1962).
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of these provisions, the independent contractor status should be
denied in order to make the carrier liable to a passenger-employee
of the lessee-driver. Replying in the affirmative, the Proctor court
held that Bales was a servant of Colonial rather than an indepen-
dent contractor as a matter of law such that Colonial was liable
for the injuries sustained by Proctor as a result of Bales' negli-
gence.
2 9
The conclusion that Bales was a servant as to passengers as
well as to members of the traveling public seems logical in light
of the broad language of the regulations. The court, however, did
not stop here, but further concluded that Colonial was liable to
Proctor for the negligence of Bales. Although the court did not
discuss the standard of care owed Proctor by Bales, it apparently
considered Proctor to be a "passenger" rather than a "guest"
such that ordinary negligence by Bales would permit recovery.
Had Proctor been a "guest," the South Carolina guest statute23
would apply and recovery would only be allowed if the accident
resulted from Bales' "heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the
rights of others. ' 2 ' The distinction between "passenger" and
"guest" for purposes of the application of the guest statute has
been stated by the South Carolina Supreme Court as follows:
A person riding in a motor vehicle is a guest if his transportation
confers a benefit only upon himself and no benefit upon the
owner or operator except such as is incidental to hospitality,
social relations, companionship, or the like as a mere gratuity;
But if his transportation contributes such tangible and substan-
tial benefits as to promote the mutual interests of both the
passenger and the owner or operator, or is primarily for the
attainment of some tangible and substantial objective or busi-
ness purpose of the owner or operator, he is not a guest .2
229. The court's conclusion with respect to the employment status of Bales was
stated as follows:
Upon the retrial the district court should direct the jury that under the
regulations Colonial was responsible for Bales' conduct in operating the equip-
ment, and negligence on his part would require a finding of liability with respect
to Colonial.
494 F.2d at 92.
230. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-801 (1962).
231. Id. The meaning of this language is discussed in an earlier section of this survey
in connection with the analysis of Martin v. Martin, 262 S.C. 169, 203 S.E.2d 385 (1974).
232. Owens v. Gresham, 258 S.C. 46, 50-51, 186 S.E.2d 816, 818 (1972), quoting from
8 AM. JUR. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 475 (1963). There have been a number
of cases in other jurisdictions where the plaintiff was a "passenger" rather than a "guest"
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This statement indicates that Proctor was a "passenger" since his
transportation was for a "business purpose of the owner." Thus
Colonial was liable for Proctor's injuries resulting from the
ordinary negligence of its "statutory" servant.
B. Products Liability
At the beginning of 1974, the applicability of the doctrine of
strict tort liability in products liability actions in South Carolina
was uncertain.233 This uncertainty was made apparent in
McHugh v. Carlton234 in which Judge Hemphill, writing for the
federal district court in a diversity action, declined to predict
whether the South Carolina Supreme Court would adopt the doc-
trine of strict tort liability as expressed in section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.2 Judge Hemphill was concerned
with the principle of "comity between the state and federal
courts," 21 and believed that under the Erie doctrine237 he should
"not attempt to usurp South Carolina's hereditary right to pro-
mulgate its own common law. . ... "I McHugh was discussed in
last year's survey of 1973 tort decisions239 and the author of that
survey suggested that the Fourth Circuit follow a "more logi-
cal '2 4 approach to the Erie problem and "eliminate any question
because of a business or employment relationship between the driver and passenger. See,
e.g., Sullivan v. Stock, 98 So.2d 507 (Fla. App. 1957); Hasbrook v. Wingate, 152 Ohio St.
50, 87 N.E.2d 87 (1949); Garrett v. Hammack, 162 Va. 42, 173 S.E. 535 (1934).
233. The uncertainty surrounding the doctrine of strict tort liability in South Caro-
lina was extensively discussed in Torts, 1973 Survey of S.C. Law, 26 S.C.L. REv. 336-44
(1974).
234. 269 F. Supp. 1271 (D.S.C. 1974).
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
236. 369 F. Supp. at 1279.
237. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
238. 369 F. Supp. at 1279.
239. Torts, 1973 Survey of S.C. Law, 26 S.C.L. REv. 336 (1974).
240. Id. at 343.
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as to the applicability of the doctrine of strict tort liability in
South Carolina."I A different approach to the Erie problem,
however, is no longer needed because on July 9, 1974, a legislative
enactment of section 402A became effective. 42
Section 402A, in its status as a statute, was again presented
as an issue before Judge Hemphill in the case of Cooley v. Sal-
opian Industries, Ltd.243 There, the plaintiff purchased poultry
equipment for use in egg production from the defendant, a British
company licensed to do business in South Carolina. After the
equipment was delivered, the plaintiff found that it was defective
and sued for damages, framing his complaint on theories of negli-
gence, 44 breach of warranty,2 45 and strict tort liability under sec-
tion 402A. In response to the defendant's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim,246 Judge Hemphill found that under sec-
tion 402A the plaintiff could not recover for any damages to the
goods themselves which were caused by their defective condi-
tion;24 recovery under this statute was limited to personal injuries
or damages to other property caused by the defective product.
Thus Judge Hemphill construed the pertinent part of section
402A in accordance with the intent of the drafters to read as
follows:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or to his (other) property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his (other) property, .. 24
241. Id. at 344.
242. S.C. CODE ANN. § 66-371 (Cum. Supp. 1974) contains substantially the same
language as § 402A of the RESTATEMENT. Two additional sections were also added. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 66-372 (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides:
If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and
nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured
by it, he is barred from recovery.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 66-373 (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides: "Comments to Section 402A of the
Restatement of Torts, Second, are incorporated herein by reference thereto as the legisla-
tive intent of this chapter."
243. 383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974).
244. The plaintiff alleged negligence in the "design, manufacture, assembly, delivery,
handling, and repair" of the equipment. Id. at 1115.
245. The warranties allegedly breached were the "express warranty under the con-
tract,. . . implied warranty of merchantability under the Code of Laws of South Carolina
§ 10.2-314 (1966), . . . [and] implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under
§ 10.2-315 .... " Id.
246. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
247. 383 F. Supp. at 1118-19.
248. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966). This construction is accur-
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Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's
cause of action for strict tort liability was granted and the plain-
tiff was left free to pursue his other theories of recovery.
Although the defendant's motion to dismiss the claim under
section 402A was granted, it was not granted on the theory
argued. The defendant asserted that the statute was inapplicable
because the cause of action arose before the effective date of the
statute. This argument, however, was destroyed by Judge Hem-
phill's pronouncement that section 402A was retrospective be-
cause the doctrine of strict tort liability was remedial in nature.24
This statement of dictum was based on the rules governing re-
trospective application of statutes discussed in Howard v.
Allen.'" The issue rasied in Howard was whether South Caro-
lina's long-arm statute could be applied retroactively so as to
permit service on an out-of-state defendant in a case where the
alleged tort occurred prior to the enactment of the statute. Judge
Hemphill, in applying the long-arm statute retroactively stated
the rule as follows:
[W]hile a principle rule of statutory construction is that stat-
utes are to be construed to operate prospectively unless there is
a clear legislative intent to the contrary, a principle exception
to this rule is that remedial or procedural statutes are generally
held to operate retrospectively. In fact, . . . statutes relating to
remedies or modes of procedure do not come within the legal
ate to the extent it refers to loss of bargain. Dean Prosser, the reporter of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), has stated:
The difficulty concerns mere loss on the bargain, which is to say that the product
which the plaintiff has received is only worth less than the price he has paid for
it. Here a small majority of the courts have denied the strict liability; but there
are three that have permitted the recovery. The denial would appear to be the
sounder rule.
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791,
822-23 (1966) (footnotes omitted). Where, however, there is damage to the product not in
the nature of a loss of bargain, "as where an automobile is wrecked by reason of its own
bad brakes," section 402A will permit recovery. Id. at 821. In Cooley, the plaintiff's
claimed damage was a loss of bargain and the § 402A claim was properly dismissed.
249. Judge Hemphill stated:
Since the doctrine is remedial in nature, this statute is retrospective and may
be asserted by any plaintiff when his or her complaint is filed with a court after
the enactment of the statute, regardless of the fact that the cause of action arose
before the enactment of the doctrine into the law of South Carolina.
383 F. Supp. at 1118.
250. 368 F. Supp. 310 (D.S.C.), aff'd per curiam, 487 F.2d 1397 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 912 (1974).
[Vol. 27
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conception of a retrospective law as long as they do not create
new rights or take away vested rights.
21
Unfortunately, the meanings of the terms contained in this rule
are anything but clear. An analysis of a statute in terms of being
"remedial" or as granting or impairing "vested rights" takes on
the appearance of being mere rhetoric in search of a principle. It
is one thing to state that a remedial statute which does not de-
stroy vested rights can be retrospectively applied; it is quite an-
other to determine whether in fact a particular statute provides
a new remedy for an existing right and whether certain expecta-
tions under prior law amount to vested rights.
The remedial character of a statute is dependent upon its
effect upon existing rights.252 If the right for which the remedy is
granted did not exist prior to the enactment of the statute in
question or if the remedy is "part of the right, 253 then the statute
is not sufficiently "remedial" to result in retrospective operation.
Clearly, the resolution to this problem turns on a comparison of
the "rights" of the parties as they exist before and after the enact-
ment of the statute.24 A good discussion of vested rights in the
context of the retrospectivity problem is that of the Connecticut
Supreme Court of Errors in Massa v. Nastri.5  In Massa, a guest
in an automobile sued the host-driver for injuries sustained in an
accident which occurred prior to the repeal by the Connecticut
legislature of that state's guest statute. The issue presented was
whether the plaintiff was required to prove heedlessness or reck-
lessness as required by the prior law, or whether the repeal of the
statute operated retrospectively so as to permit recovery with
proof of simple negligence. Finding that the prior exemption from
liability for simple negligence amounted to a vested right, the
court held that the repeal of the guest statute could only be given
prospective effect.
251. 368 F. Supp. at 315. In support of the principles stated in this rule, Judge
Hemphill cited Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 138, 141 (1968); 50 AM. JuR. Statutes § 482 (1944);
and 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 421 (1953).
252. See 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTrrurIONAL LIMITATIONS 754-56 (8th ed. 1927).
253. Id. at 754; Davis v. Meadors-Cherry Co., 65 N.M. 21, 331 P.2d 523 (1958).
254. The South Carolina Supreme Court used this "before/after" approach in Pul-
liam v. Doe, 246 S.C. 106, 142 S.E.2d 861 (1965). The supreme court concluded that the
1963 amendment to the uninsured motorist act could not be applied retroactively because
it would destory vested contract rights established prior to the statute. Id. at 111-12, 142
S.E.2d at 864.
255. 125 Conn. 144, 3 A.2d 839 (1939).
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The issue of the retroactivity of the statutory enactment of
section 402A of the Restatement can be subjected to similar anal-
ysis. The question then becomes whether under prior law a
defendant-seller of a defective product had an exemption from
strict liability in tort which amounted to a vested right. In an-
swering this question, two factors should be considered. The first
is whether retrospective application of the statute will "impose
liabilities not existing prior to its passage." '56 Unlike the repeal
of the guest statute in Massa, the legislative enactment of section
402A did not create any new liabilities. Prior to such enactment,
the seller of a defective product was subject to liability although
under other theories such as negligence and breach of warranty.
Strict liability in tort under the statute, although possibly lessen-
ing the difficulty of establishing a prima facie case, does not
impose liability in a case where the defendant was assured of
nonliability under negligence and warranty principles. 5 ' In fact,
256. Id. at 148, 3 A.2d at 841.
257. Despite some of the difficulties plaintiffs encounter in proving their case in
negligence or breach of warranty, defendants are not assured of nonliability. Courts will
often go to great lengths to permit inferences of negligence from the fact that the product
was defective using such theories as negligence per se, res ipsa loquitur, and circumstan-
tial evidence. Thus, under section 402A, the defendant is subjected to no new liabilities.
True, the plaintiff is not required to prove negligence; he is, however, required to prove
that the product was in a "defective condition" such that it was "unreasonably danger-
ous." If the plaintiff is able to prove his case under strict tort (he has shown the existence
of a defect making the product unreasonably dangerous) he has established a sufficient
basis for an inference of negligence such that the defendant would not be assured of
escaping liability in the absence of the strict tort theory. With respect to this similarity
between negligence and strict liability in tort see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 840-42, 848 (1966), where he states that
"[w]hen the plaintiff has proved [the elements required for recovery in strict tort] ...
he usually recovers in a negligence action against the manufacturer." Id. at 842. Other
authors have stated that the tests for negligence and strict tort liability are identical
except to the extent that negligence requires a showing of the defendant's knowledge of
the condition of the product when he placed it on the market. See Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15-16 (1965); Note, Products Liability and
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEO. L.J. 286, 323 (1966).
An argument may be raised that although the strict tort theory does nothing more
than lessen the plaintiff's burden of proof against a manufacturer, it does create a new
liability against a retailer or wholesaler who cannot be proved negligent either directly or
inferentially. To the extent that this argument is accurate, the breach of warranty princi-
ples may be shown to have subjected such retailer or wholesaler to at least potential
liability in warranty even without the use of the strict tort theory. The application of the
warranty provisions of Article 2 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, coupled with the
willingness of courts to create fictions to avoid some of the obstacles to recovery in war-
ranty, should negate any claim by the defendant that he was assured of nonliability. With
respect to the similarity of the strict tort and warranty theories see Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1124-34 (1960).
[Vol. 27
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now that the citadel has fallen,211 in most cases the addition of
section 402A to the plaintiff's arsenal of theoretical weaponry is
needless overkill. The plaintiff can usually win with or without
the strict tort weapon.259
The second factor to be considered in determining the retros-
pectivity of a statute is whether its enactment would result in
"unexpected liability. 260 In Massa, the host had the right to an-
ticipate liability to his guest only in those situations where he was
proved to be heedless and reckless. This expectancy was based on
a statute which the courts were obliged to apply. There was no
such expectancy, however, prior to the enactment of section
402A. No statute gave a seller the right to anticipate liability only
in those situations where he was proven to have been negligent
or to have breached an express or implied warranty. The seller
would have had no vested expectancy right unless he had had
"something more than such a mere expectation as may [have
been] based upon an anticipated continuance of the present gen-
eral laws. .. "2
Since the enactment of section 402A did not affect any vested
rights to exemptions from liability and since no new liabilities
were imposed, the statute was of a remedial character such that
it could be applied retrospectively. Judge Hemphill's statement
in dictum to this effect was therefore correct.
Dean Prosser shows in this article that the strict tort theory is merely a simpler way of
stating the same principle as that of breach of warranty. The warranty theory imposes
strict liability, but carries with it a lot of "baggage" from the law of sales. Strict liability
in tort embraces the same principle yet eliminates the baggage.
258. The reference here is to the "citadel of privity," a phrase coined by Justice
Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931), and
subsequently used by Dean Prosser in the two famous articles on strict liability in tort
cited in note 257 supra.
259. In defective design cases, it has been stated that the theories of negligence,
warranty, and strict tort are virtually identical. See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
489 F.2d 1066, 1068 n.2 (4th Cir. 1974); Chestnut v. Fort Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 968
(4th Cir. 1971). See also Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
Miss. L.J. 825, 841 (1973), where the negligence and strict tort theories were equated in
negligent design cases. This article also indicated that the negligence and strict tort
theories are similar in cases involving defective warnings or instructions. Id. at 842.
The most significant difference between negligence and strict tort is in cases of defec-
tive manufacture where, due to some failure in the manufacturing process, the product is
not in its intended condition. Id. at 841. Even considering the increased burden on the
plaintiff in the defective manufacture case, in most cases he can prevail under negligence
or warranty theory without resort to strict liability in tort. See note 257 supra.
260. Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 148, 3 A.2d 839, 841 (1939).
261. 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTrrTIONAL LImrrAToNs 749 (8th ed. 1927).
19751
66
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss3/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
C. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
In Graham v. Charleston County School Board, ' an 8-year-
old girl, while walking home from school, was killed when hit by
a truck. Because of her detention after school she had missed her
regular school bus transporation and, therefore, had attempted to
walk home. A wrongful death action was brought against the
truck driver and against the school board and school officials, but
the board and officials demurred alleging that the action was
barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The demurrer
was sustained. On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that section 21-111
of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 63 which established the
school district as a body politic and corporate with the power to
sue or be sued, constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, dismissed this
contention and reaffirmed the rule expressed in Sherbert v.
School District No. 85, Spartanburg County."' In Sherbert, the
court held that while a school district could be sued on its con-
tracts, it could not be sued in actions ex delicto. Although recog-
nizing that a political subdivision of the state can lose its immun-
ity through an express enactment by the legislature waiving such
immunity, ' the Sherbert court did not find an express legislative
intent to waive sovereign immunity in section 21-111. Accord-
ingly, the trial court's decision to sustain the demurrer was af-
firmed.
In United States v. Edens,85 the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity was invoked to deny the federal district court's jurisdic-
tion over the defendant's counterclaim. The United States
brought suit against the defendant-real estate broker alleging dis-
criminatory practices under 42 U.S.C. § 361387 and seeking equi-
262. 262 S.C. 314, 204 S.E.2d 384 (1974).
263. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-111 (1962) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Every school district is and shall be a body politic and corporate, by the name
and style of. . . . In that name it may sue and be sued and be capable of
contracting and being contracted with to the extent of its school fund and
holding such real and personal estate as it may have or come into possession of,
by will or otherwise, or as is authorized by law to be purchased, all of which shall
be used exclusively for school purposes.
264. 169 S.C. 191, 168 S.E. 391 (1933).
264. Id.
266. 372 F. Supp. 1317 (D.S.C. 1974).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970) provides:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person
or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full
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table relief. Edens counterclaimed for attorney's fees alleging
that the suit was "vexatious, harassing and unmeritorious. ' 68
Since the counterclaim resembled a suit for abuse of process,
immunity had not been waived by the Federal Tort Claims Act. 69
That Act does not apply to claims "arising out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights." 70 The counterclaim was a suit against the
sovereign and thus was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
D. Rights Deprived "Under Color of State Law"
Any person who acts under color of state law to deprive an-
other of any "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws"2'' is subject to liability in damages to the
party whose rights are so deprived. 2 In Green v. Cauthen,7 3 four
types of conduct were held to justify imposition of liability on a
defendant alleged to be acting under color of state law: (1) illegal
arrest of the plaintiff, (2) failure to provide him with needed
medical attention while incarcerated, (3) use of unreasonable and
malicious force, and (4) negligent supervision by a defendant of
his subordinates. The case arose out of an incident which oc-
curred in Columbia on July 24, 1972. Allegedly, the plaintiff was
sitting in a car, legally parked on a Columbia street, when four
Columbia police officers approached the car, ordered the plaintiff
out, and then "proceeded to beat him about the face, head, chest,
back, knees, and legs."' 4 The officers then arrested the plaintiff
without probable cause and confined him in the city jail where
he was given no medical attention for his injuries. A trial was held
enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter, or that any group of
persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this subchapter and such
denial raises an issue of general public importance, he may bring a civil action
in any appropriate United States district court by filing with it a complaint
setting forth the facts and requesting such preventive relief, restraining order,
or other order against the person or persons responsible for such pattern or
practice or denial of rights, as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment
of the rights granted by this subchapter.
268. 372 F. Supp. at 1318.
269. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671 et seq.
(1970).
270. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970) (emphasis added).
271. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
272. Id.
273. 379 F. Supp. 361 (D.S.C. 1974).
274. Id. at 367.
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a few days later where the plaintiff was charged with public drun-
kenness, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest. These charges,
however, were dismissed on the basis of the police officers' testi-
mony which indicated that the plaintiff "was asleep in his car and
was not disturbing anyone when said defendants effected the ar-
rest.", '
Although a number of legal issues were presented in the
plaintiff's suit, the only issue relevant to tort law was the plain-
tiff's section 1983 claim for damages against the police officers,
the chief of police, the city manager, the members of the Colum-
bia Civil Service Commission, and the Columbia Police Depart-
ment. This issue was presented to the court in a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim in which the third ground of the motion
stated:
The amended complaint fails to state a claim against the defen-
dants on which relief can be granted on the basis that the facts
alleged do not constitute a deprivation under color of state or
municipal authority of any rights, privileges or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws of the United States as
required by 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
Although the section 1983 claim against the Columbia Police
Department failed because the department was not a person
within the meaning of section 1983,211 the claims against the indi-
vidual defendants for the four types of conduct previously men-
tioned were sustained.
The Green opinion, written by Judge Hemphill, is very thor-
ough and the conclusions of law are well supported by citations
to appropriate cases. 8 A summary of Judge Hemphill's conclu-
sions as to the validity of the section 1983 claims, based on the
four types of misconduct alleged by plaintiff, is as follows:
Illegal Arrest. Numerous cases have held that a person has a
constitutional right to be free from illegal arrest and detention.
The violation of this right is actionable under section 1983.
Medical attention while incarcerated. Although no right of
action arises from improper or negligent medical treatment, an
absolute denial of any medical attention may result in liability
under section 1983.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 368.
277. See Nugent v. Sheppard, 318 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
278. See cases cited in Green at 369-70.
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Unreasonable and malicious force. Regardless of whether an
arrest is legal or illegal, the arrestee has a right to be free from
malicious or unnecessary force. The violation of this right may
also be a basis for section 1983 liability.
Negligent supervision of subordinates. A section 1983 plain-
tiff may sue for the deprivation of his rights resulting from negli-
gent conduct of another person who is acting under color of state
law. This rule imposes liability on city or state officials for the
actions of their subordinates when these subordinates were negli-
gently hired or supervised.
2 9
E. Breach of Confidence by Use and Disclosure of Trade Secret
In Wilkes v. Pioneer American Insurance Co. of Ft. Worth,
Texas,55 the plaintiff petitioned the federal district court for a
preliminary injuction restraining the defendant from the use or
disclosure of the plaintiff's "trade secret," allegedly developed by
the plaintiff to effectuate increased sales of life insurance policies
to federal employees. This concept was basically a system of
forms and procedures which would permit the life insurance
premium to be paid by an allotment from the employee's salary.
Prior to the plaintiff's research, such allotments were not being
used by the insurance companies because the provision in the
Federal Employee's Manual which permitted such allotments
conflicted with a federal law which only permitted allotments to
be paid to financial institutions such as banks and savings and
loan associations.21 After the expenditure of considerable time,
money and effort, and after consulting with counsel, the plaintiff
devised a system by which the premiums could be legally paid by
the allotments.
The plaintiff was subsequently contacted by officers of the
defendant-insurance company who expressed interest in the al-
279. Judge Hemphill's language was as follows:
If the city fathers give to a person a deadly weapon and a badge of authority to
enforce the law, they should make sure that the persons receiving such awesome
responsibility have the proper mental attitude about indiscrimate law enforce-
ment.
379 F. Supp. at 370. See also Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1973), where a
county sheriff was held to be responsible for the acts of his employees who assaulted a
criminal suspect. The Scott case was reviewed in Torts, 1973 Survey of South Carolina
Law, 26 S.C.L. REV. 356 (1974).
280. 383 F. Supp. 1135 (D.S.C. 1974).
281. This law is codified as 31 U.S.C. § 492(b) (1970).
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lotment plan. He offered to disclose the details of the plan if the
officers signed nondisclosure aqreements and required all em-
ployees and agents who might use the plan to also sign such
agreements. After these nondisclosure agreements were signed
and the plaintiff had explained his plan, a contract was executed
in which the plaintiff received a percentage of all premiums
which resulted from the use of the allotment plan. After the de-
fendant had increased its business by using the plaintiff's plan,
however, it allegedly induced some agents to violate the agree-
ment with the plaintiff and also, through its employees, disclosed
the details of the plan to other insurance companies. The plaintiff
then sued for temporary and permanent injunctions and actual
and punitive damages for the defendant's alleged violation of the
confidentiality agreement. After a hearing on a rule to show
cause, Judge Hemphill granted an injunction pendente lite en-
joining the defendant from: (1) making further disclosures of the
plan without requiring the signing of a nondisclosure agreement;
(2) failing to protect the secrecy of the plan from further disclo-
sure by the defendant's agents or employees; and (3) inducing
breaches of the agreements with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's request for a temporary injunction presented
three issues: whether the plan was a "trade secret" ; 82 whether
there was a breach of confidence; and whether a temporary in-
junction would be an appropriate remedy. Judge Hemphill relied
on the Restatement of Torts section 75723 to hold that the system
282. "The first issue to be determined in every trade secret case is not whether there
was a confidential relationship or a breach of contract or some other kind of misappropria-
tion, but whether, in fact, there was a trade secret to be misappropriated." Lowndes
Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 327, 191 S.E.2d 761, 764 (1972), citing 2 R. CALLMN,
TaE LAW OF UNFAIR CoMPETrrioN, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 51.1 (3d ed. 1968). For
a case with a factual situation analogous to Wilkes see Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006
(9th Cir. 1972). In Clark a trade secret was found to exist where "[the plan developed
by appellee,. . . encompassed all of the forms, information, and techniques, for formulat-
ing, promoting, financing, and selling contracts for 'prepaid' funeral services in the contin-
ual operation of a mortician's business." 453 F.2d at 1009.
283. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) states:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is
liable to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in
him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that
it was a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means
or that the third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his
duty to the other, or
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of procedures and forms devised by the plaintiff to permit prem-
ium payments by allocation was a trade secret. The plaintiff's
system was thus a "formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him
an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it.
' '28
4
Once the existence of a trade secret is determined, the defen-
dant's liability rests not upon any notion of the defendant's inter-
ference with the plaintiffs property right, but upon a breach of a
duty of good faith or upon a breach of confidence. 25 Accordingly,
by making use of the plaintiff's plan in violation of the nondisclo-
sure agreement, the defendant breached a confidential relation-
ship and was liable. The existence of this confidential relation-
ship was dependent upon the secrecy of the plan 88 and upon a
conscientious effort by the plaintiff to protect his secret.27 Al-
though the details of the plan were known by many employees of
the defendant and by others in the insurance business, the requi-
site element of secrecy was still present. The following language
of the Restatement is pertinent:
Substantially, a trade secret is known only in the particular
business in which it is used. It is not requisite that only the
proprietor of the business know it. He may, without losing his
protection, communicate it to employees involved in its use. He
may likewise communicate it to others pledged to secrecy.M
Since the plaintiff always insisted upon the signing of a nondis-
closure agreement before he would explain his plan, such disclo-
sure did not destroy the requisite element of secrecy. Further-
more, the plaintiff's constant insistence upon the signing of such
agreements also satisfied the requirement that he make a consci-
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and
that its disclosure was made to him by mistake.
The South Carolina Supreme Court accepted the expression of the RESTATEMENT in
Lowndes Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761 (1972).
284. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
285. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment a at 4 (1939);
Servo Corp. of America v. General Elec. Co., 393 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1968).
286. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 5-6 (1939);
Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972).
287. See Lowndes Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761 (1972); J.T.
Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 357 Mass. 728, 260 N.E.2d 723 (1970);
2 R. CALLMAN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 53.1 (3d
ed. 1968).
288. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 6 (1939).
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entious effort to protect his secret.
The final issue presented related to the appropriateness of
the injunction as a remedy. In order to be entitled to an injunc-
tion, the plaintiff must be able to show a reasonable likelihood
that he will prevail on the merits of the litigation.289 The defen-
dant asserted that such a likelihood was not shown since there
was no express nondisclosure agreement between the plaintiff and
defendant; the plaintiff had only entered into such agreements
with the officers of the defendant. Judge Hemphill, however, eas-
ily dismissed this contention relying upon various cases 9' which
stated rules similar to the following rule expressed in section 757
of the Restatement:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privi-
lege to do so, is liable to the other if. . . (c) he learned the secret
from a third person with notice of the facts that it was a secret
and that . . . the third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a
breach of his duty to the other .... "I
The defendant clearly had knowledge that the plan was a secret
and that the disclosure of the plan would be a breach of its offi-
cers' duty of confidentiality. Under the Restatement rule, there-
fore, the absence of an express agreement between the plaintiff
and the defendant was of no consequence. Accordingly, the plain-
tiff had shown a clear likelihood of prevailing on the merits and
a temporary injuction was appropriate.
289. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners of S.W. Va., 442 F.2d 1261 (4th
Cir. 1971); Wilkes v. Pioneer American Ins. Co. of Ft. Worth, Texas, 383 F. Supp. 1135
(D.S.C. 1974).
290. In Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prods., 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 843 (1956), the court adopted the rule in clause (c) of section 757 of the
RESTATEMENT. In Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912 (7th Cir.
1953), the rule was stated that an employer who has knowledge that his employee knows
a trade secret through a confidential relationship may be enjoined from the use or disclo-
sure of that trade secret. In Herold v. Herold China & Pottery Co., 257 F. 911 (6th Cir.
1919), the court stated that trade secrets will be protected by injunction "not only against
those who attempt to disclose or use them in violation of confidential relations or contracts
express or implied, but as against those who are participating in such attempt with
knowledge of such confidential relations or contract, though they might in time have
reached the same result by their own experiments or efforts." Id. at 913.
291. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
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